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EMPIRICAL STUDY
Bernard A. Burk, Jerome M. Organ, Emma B. Rasiel*
Many casual observers of the American legal academy are aware of the substantial falloff in both the number and the conventional qualifications of applicants to law school that began after 2010. But few appreciate how widespread
and serious its effects have been. For the vast majority of law schools, those effects have been somewhere between significant and devastating.
From academic years 2010–11 through 2016–17, the number of unique applicants to accredited law schools fell 36 percent, and the number of applications
fell 44 percent, while students with the best conventional qualifications disproportionately stayed away. The effects on the academy have been profound, and
sectors of the academy distinguished by their relative overall reputation for
quality have reacted differently. Beyond the strongest law schools, many shrank
their entering classes by between a third and a half, and dropped 15 LSAT percentiles at the median. We estimate that aggregate annual tuition revenue for all
accredited American law schools fell over $1.5 billion from its inflation-adjusted
peak in 2011–12.
Generally we found, as might be expected, that the weaker a law school’s
relative reputation for overall quality (“Reputation”), the more difficulty it had
attracting students with the credentials it sought, so that as Reputation decreased,
entering-class credentials (“Profile”), entering-class Size, and average tuition
actually paid (“Net Tuition”) also decreased. But this general and unsurprising
finding came with some surprising variations and exceptions. These results lead
to four observations with important implications for the legal academy:
First, Reputationally Stronger law schools generally chose to preserve entering-class Profile, even when they had to shrink class Size or discount tuition to do
so. This strategic drive to keep Profile up at the expense of Size meant thousands
of viable candidates remained available to other law schools, effectively preventing the closing of as many as twenty Reputationally Weaker schools.
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Second, by shrinking class Size and reducing Net Tuition to keep up their entering-class Profile, many law schools sacrificed millions of dollars of Tuition
Revenue. As a practical matter, then, law schools “invested” in Profile rather
than in expanding their faculties, their facilities, or their access to clinical and
experiential education. We encourage discussion of the implications of this investment choice.
Third, some Reputationally Weaker law schools perversely were able to
maintain or raise their average Net Tuition, while many law schools with stronger
Reputations found themselves forced to reduce average Net Tuition more aggressively. Because discounts at any specific law school, and more generally across
all law schools, tend to flow to stronger students, the students with the least promising prospects for obtaining or making any economically sustainable use of their
law degrees are paying the highest prices to obtain them. These inequalities expanded significantly after 2010.
Fourth and finally, because both Tuition Revenue and Profile decreased at
many law schools, the distance between student needs and school resources has
widened—millions of dollars in forgone Tuition Revenue are unavailable to meet
the needs of students who at many law schools are significantly less prepared and
qualified than their predecessors. The decreases in Bar Examination performance
nationwide from 2014 to 2016 are a likely consequence of this growing incongruity.
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INTRODUCTION
Many casual observers of the American legal academy are aware of the
substantial falloff in both the number and the conventional qualifications of applicants to law school that began after 2010. But few appreciate how widespread and serious its effects have been, and there have been no studies, or at
least no public studies, reporting either the overall nature and extent of those
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effects or how law schools have coped with the shock. This Article tries to fill
that gap, analyzing the legal academy as a competitive market for legal education, with law schools as sellers and prospective law students as buyers.
Part I examines and quantifies the shock to the market for legal education
that began after 2010, and its effects on accredited law schools. From academic
years 2010–11 through 2016–17 (the “Comparison Period”), the number of
unique applicants to accredited law schools fell 36 percent, and the number of
applications fell a little less than 44 percent.1 In addition, the conventional metrics by which most admissions decisions are made—Law School Admissions
Test (“LSAT”) scores and undergraduate grade-point average (“UGPA”)—
declined even more, as more highly credentialed applicants disproportionately
stayed away. For example, while the number of applicants overall fell 36 percent, the number of applicants with LSAT scores greater than 160 (roughly the
80th percentile of all test-takers) fell 46 percent, while those with scores under
150 (roughly the 44th percentile) fell only 27 percent.2
The effects on the academy have been profound. By 2016–17, the average
American law school had an entering class that was nearly one-third smaller
and had a median LSAT score seven percentiles lower than in 2010–11. And
while Base Tuition (a school’s published “sticker price”) had risen 15 percent,
the average tuition discount had doubled, causing the average tuition paid per
student net of discounts (“Net Tuition”) to fall over 6 percent in constant dollars over the Comparison Period.3
Nor were these effects distributed evenly across the academy. Instead, sectors of the academy distinguished by their relative overall reputation for quality
(“Reputation”) were affected quite differently. Among the private law schools
that were part of this study, those in the top third Reputationally (the “Reputationally Stronger” schools) saw average entering-class Size decline by only 13
percent while their average median LSAT percentile fell three points. By contrast, among the bottom two-thirds of law schools Reputationally, average entering-class Size shrank by over a third and nearly a half, respectively, while
average median LSAT fell 15 and 14 percentiles, respectively. Effects on the
gross amounts of tuition collected (“Tuition Revenue”) were also pronounced.
Reputationally Stronger law schools lost an average of $5.9 million per school
in annual Tuition Revenue, while the bottom two-thirds of law schools Reputationally lost on average $11.6 million and $12.2 million annually per school,
respectively in constant 2018 dollars.4 We estimate that aggregate annual Tui-

1

See infra Figure 1.1, Appendix II.
See infra Figure 1.2.
3 See infra Section I.B.
4 See infra Section I.B, Table 1.1. These effects describe the 110 accredited private law
schools in the sample that is the basis for this study which, based on the statistical testing we
have been able to do with the data available, appears representative of all accredited law
schools during the Comparison Period. See infra Section II.C, Appendix II.
2
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tion Revenue for all accredited American law schools fell over $1.5 billion in
current dollars between its inflation-adjusted peak in 2011–12 and 2016–17.5
In Part II, we discuss our data and methods, including how we define and
measure the three “Performance Variables” that describe an individual law
school’s relative performance as a seller in the market for legal education over
the Comparison Period. Those variables are the change in the entering-class’s
LSAT scores and UGPA over the six-year period (“ΔProfile”); the change in
the size of the entering class (“ΔSize”); and the change in the average discounted tuition (after accounting for scholarships) paid per student (“ΔNet Tuition”).6
These three variables reflect three ways that law schools coped with the
sudden and drastic fall in demand to which they were subjected.7 Faced with
fewer and less qualified prospective students, law schools had to make hard
choices among the Performance Variables in selecting each new class of firstyear students. A law school could try to preserve entering-class Profile by sacrificing Size (taking fewer students, which makes it easier to maintain or minimize decrease in Profile) and/or by sacrificing Net Tuition (trying to get
stronger students by selectively offering them lower tuition); or it could preserve entering-class Size by sacrificing Profile (taking a larger class of weaker
students) and/or Net Tuition (effectively obtaining more buyers by lowering
price); or it might try to hold Net Tuition higher by sacrificing Size (recognizing that fewer students are likely to pay the higher price) and/or Profile (recognizing that stronger students will likely get better tuition deals elsewhere). Given that Size and Net Tuition combine to generate Tuition Revenue, to some
extent these decisions balance Profile against Revenue.
We then measure correlations between each Performance Variable and law
schools’ Reputations. Part III discusses what we expected to find, and what was
actually there.8 We expected that each Performance Variable would be correlated with Reputation. In other words, we expected to see that the weaker a law
school’s relative Reputation for quality, the more difficulty it would have attracting students with the credentials it sought, so that as Reputation decreased,

5

See infra Section I.B. This effect is extrapolated from our sample to all accredited law
schools. See supra Section II.C, Appendix II.
6 The Greek letter Δ (delta) is used in its traditional sense of referring to change. Delta,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
7 One variable we do not address is each school’s access to operating funds other than tuition, such as central university support, “rainy-day” funds, endowment, fundraising, and tuition from non-JD programs. Obviously, alternative sources of funding affect the conditions
and incentives for discounting tuition, but available data allow us to estimate only law
schools’ degree of tuition discounting. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
8 Because available data made estimating average Net Tuition at public law schools impossible, we worked with a sample of 110 private law schools, which we tested as best we could
with available data to ensure it was representative of the entire population of accredited
schools as a whole. See infra Section II.C, Appendix II.
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Profile, Size and Net Tuition would also decrease.9 This hypothesis proved
generally true, but with some (at least to us) surprising and enlightening exceptions.
When we explored the relation between Performance Variable changes and
Reputational strength, change in entering-class Size over the Comparison Period was, as expected, correlated with Reputation over the whole population tested. But when we divided our sample into three subgroups by relative Reputation and tested the correlation within each subgroup, the three subgroups
performed differently. In the top and bottom thirds Reputationally, change in
Size was correlated with Reputation, but in the middle third it was not. We ascribe this anomaly to a phenomenon we call “Tradeoff Variability”: Schools in
the middle third Reputationally (“Reputationally Middle”) were under substantial pressure to adjust to the sudden fall in demand, and at a competitive disadvantage relative to Reputationally Stronger schools. In adjusting, each law
school chose to compromise on the three different Performance Variables in its
own way, depending on its circumstances. In varying degrees, some chose to
give up more on Size; others more on Profile; yet others more on Net Tuition.
Because each law school “chose its poison”—or rather its mix of poisons—in
different proportions, competitive pressures were spread across the Performance Variables sufficiently unequally from school to school that none of the
Performance Variables was meaningfully correlated with Reputation in this
subgroup.10
When we examined the relationship between Reputation and change over
the Comparison Period in entering-class Profile, we again saw, as expected,
that change in Profile was correlated with Reputation over the whole population tested. But when we isolated subgroups by relative Reputation and tested
each separately, the correlation was statistically significant only in the Reputationally Stronger set of schools. For the reasons just discussed, we believe
Tradeoff Variability explains the lack of correlation among Reputationally
Middle schools. As for the bottom third Reputationally (“Reputationally Weaker” schools), it appears Regulatory Constraints affected performance. The Reputationally Weaker law schools were willing to sacrifice Profile but were unable to reduce their already-low entering-class Profile by as much as they
otherwise might have because accreditation standards require schools to accept
only students who appear able to graduate and pass a bar exam.11
Finally, when we looked at the relationship between Reputation and
change in average scholarship-discounted Net Tuition per student over the
Comparison Period, surprisingly there was no statistically significant correlation over the whole population. The reason becomes clearer when we look at
the Reputational subgroups: Reputationally Stronger schools did see a correla9

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.1, Table 3.2.
11 See infra Section III.B.2, Table 3.3.
10
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tion between Reputation and Net Tuition, which shows that among Reputationally stronger law schools, the stronger the Reputation, the easier it is for the
school to hold its price (Net Tuition) and still keep getting the number and
quality of students it prefers. Reputationally Middle schools did not see any
meaningful correlation, again because of Tradeoff Variability. But among Reputationally Weaker schools, to our surprise Reputation was negatively correlated to a statistically significant degree with Net Tuition. In other words, some of
the Reputationally Weaker schools were able to give up less in tuition discounts
than some schools with stronger Reputations, and in some cases were actually
able to raise their average Net Tuition and Tuition Revenue over the course of
the Comparison Period.
On its face, this seems quite odd; typically a product widely believed to be
of inferior quality commands an inferior price. We believe this anomaly is explained by what we call the Limited Options Effect: That is, the weakest students who are admitted to the Reputationally Weaker law schools have few options from which to choose. Those Reputationally Weaker law schools willing
to admit the weakest students decline to negotiate tuition discounts with them
because they don’t have to—these students have no or very limited alternatives
if they wish to go to law school. In addition, this result may reflect a different
weighting of the risks and potential rewards of being a weaker student at a
weaker law school among the socioeconomically disadvantaged applicants who
are disproportionately represented in this cohort as compared with applicants
with broader options. As a result, some of these law schools can concede, on
average, less in tuition than law schools that are better regarded, and in that
sense, more in demand.12
Similar factors lead to similar results when we examine the relationship between Reputation and change in total Tuition Revenue per school. The correlations between Reputation and Tuition Revenue also reveal that Reputationally
Stronger schools tend to preserve Profile over Size or Net Tuition, and in fact
effectively forgo millions of dollars annually in Tuition Revenue to do so.13
These findings point to several important observations with implications
for the current state and probable future of the legal academy, which we discuss
in Part IV. Four strike us as particularly salient:
First, the Reputationally Stronger law schools chose to preserve enteringclass Profile at the expense of Size (and Net Tuition). In other words, they pursued students with credentials at or near the levels they maintained before the
shock and were willing to accept smaller entering classes (and more highly discounted tuition) to get them. In the aggregate, this left thousands of viable candidates for less prestigious law schools. The difference amounts to about sixty
students per class in Reputationally bottom-half institutions, or the aggregate
entering class of about twenty such law schools. In short, elite and highly re12
13

See infra Section III.B.3, Table 3.4.
See infra Section III.B.4, Table 3.5.
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garded law schools’ drive to keep their Profiles up effectively prevented the
closing of as many as twenty weaker law schools.14
Second, by 2016, many law schools had sacrificed millions of dollars in
Tuition Revenue per year to try to maintain their Profiles. As a practical matter,
then, some of the best-regarded law schools in the country made a choice to
“invest” in trying to maintain Profile rather than generating revenue that might
have allowed them to expand their faculty, facilities, or access to clinical and
experiential education. We express no view on whether this was a wise investment choice and concede the possibility that it might have been necessary to
preserve the quality that these law schools already enjoyed given the prevailing
competitive environment. But surely the issue is worth discussing.15
Third, while Base Tuition increased 10 to 15 percent in constant dollars
over the course of the Comparison Period, average Net Tuition per student actually decreased—at many schools by double digits. As a result, the range of
prices students paid for a legal education increased significantly over the Comparison Period. And because almost all scholarships at almost all law schools
are “merit-” (that is, predominantly Profile-) based, overwhelmingly the weakest students paid the highest Net Tuition. In short, generally those students with
the least promising prospects for obtaining or making any economically sustainable use of their law degrees are paying the highest prices to obtain them,
and these inequalities grew considerably over the course of the Comparison Period.16
Fourth and finally, both Tuition Revenue and Profile decreased at many
law schools during the Comparison Period, in some cases substantially. As a
result, many law schools are welcoming the least-credentialed and leastacademically-prepared classes they have ever encountered, with more students
than ever in need of new or supplemental teaching and learning resources. Yet
those schools face those student needs with unprecedentedly depleted resources
because of the Net-Tuition and entering-class-Size reductions they have made.
Even more ironically, the weakest students, who typically pay the highest Net
Tuition, are seeing their disproportionate financial contributions allocated to
educational resources other than the ones that they typically need more than
their classmates do. In short, the discrepancy between student needs and law
school resources has widened considerably since 2010—on the order of $1.5
billion per year less in Tuition Revenue to meet the needs of students that at
many law schools are on average 15 LSAT percentiles less prepared and qualified.17 And the needs of the students who pay the most in tuition are being attended to least. We are already seeing decreases in bar-passage statistics na14

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
16 See infra Section IV.C.
17 We acknowledge that the LSAT is an imperfect measure of anything that matters, but it
has been shown to be at least a somewhat useful indicator of whatever constellation of preparation, drive, and innate abilities lead to success in law school. See infra note 35.
15
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tionwide, to which these trends cannot be irrelevant. The needs and prospects
of these underserved students deserve to be seriously considered.18
I.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: THE MARKET FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, AND
THE 2010 MARKET SHOCK

A. The US Market for Legal Education
By appointment of the United States Department of Education, law-school
programs in the United States terminating in the Juris Doctor (“JD”) degree are
accredited and regulated by the American Bar Association Section of Legal
Education and Admission to the Bar and its governing Council (the “ABA”).19
18

See infra Section IV.D.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1099b (2012) (listing the requirements for recognition by the Department
of Education); 34 C.F.R. § 602.1 (2018) (discussing the purpose of accrediting agencies); 34
C.F.R. § 602.2 (2018) (discussing the Department of Education’s online published list of
accredited agencies); Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg7.html#law [https://perma.cc/L3
SW-ZD4K] (listing the American Bar Association as the only accredited agency for legal
education in the United States). We will refer to these accrediting authorities for convenience
as the “ABA,” though for accreditation purposes the Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar and its governing Council by law must be, and to all appearances are, “separate and independent” from the American Bar Association itself. See 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(b);
34 C.F.R. § 602.14(b) (2018).
This study focuses exclusively on accredited JD programs. Accreditation is important because a JD degree from an accredited American law school will allow an aspiring lawyer to
sit for the Bar Examination in any American State or the District of Columbia, and passing a
Bar Examination is almost always a prerequisite for a license to practice law in the administering jurisdiction. (A few states and the District of Columbia will allow an individual to apply for licensure based on bar-passage and licensure in a sister state; and states that rely on
the Uniform Bar Examination (“UBE”)—currently about twenty-five—will typically allow
applicants to rely on their UBE scores wherever the exam was taken, though the passing
UBE score varies from state to state.) A few states allow individuals to take their bar exams
if they have graduated from a non-ABA-accredited law school approved by the state or have
qualified by other means (such as independent study of the law under the supervision of a
licensed lawyer), but these alternative routes to licensure are relatively rare, and rarely successful. See generally NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR. ASS’N SECTION OF
LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION
REQUIREMENTS 2018 1–11 (Judith A. Gundersen & Claire J. Guback eds., 2018).
Many law schools also offer non-JD postgraduate legal education programs, including LLM
and JSD degrees subsequent to the JD, as well as a proliferating number of postgraduate
non-JD programs, typically of a year’s (or two years’ part-time) duration, terminating in a
degree often referred to as a Master’s Degree in Legal Science (MLS) or Juridical Science
(MJS). The latter programs usually focus on legally-oriented functions in various arms of
commerce that are not always performed by licensed lawyers. They are much smaller than
the flagship JD programs, but have been growing in size and number as demand for the JD
degree has fallen. See Derek T. Muller, One in Ten Law School Enrollees is Not a Part of a
JD Program, EXCESS DEMOCRACY (Jan. 22, 2016), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2016
/1/one-in-ten-law-school-enrollees-is-not-a-part-of-a-jd-program [https://perma.cc/L29G-2Z
7C]. Non-JD postgraduate programs are not accredited by the ABA, though the ABA retains
authority to permit accredited institutions offering JDs to offer the non-JD programs along19
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During the time period this Article explores—academic years 2010–11 through
2016–17, the reasons for which will become clear shortly and to which we refer
as the “Comparison Period”—nearly 200 law schools in the United States offered fully-accredited JD programs.20
Because a JD from an ABA-accredited law school is required in the vast
majority of states to sit for the bar exam, most people considering a career as a
lawyer seek admission to an ABA-accredited law school. By far the two most
influential criteria in admissions decisions are applicants’ scores on the Law
School Admission Test (“LSAT”), and their undergraduate grade-point averages (“UGPA”).21 Law schools vary considerably in their selectivity with respect
to these criteria, to which we refer as student “Profile.”22 Higher levels of both
side. For a list maintained by the ABA of the dozens of non-JD programs conducted by accredited law schools, see LL.M. and Post-J.D. Degrees by School, ABA, https://www.americ
anbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/llm-degrees_post_j_d_non_j_d/programs_by_sc
hool.html [https://perma.cc/7VYF-N4TJ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019). Our study does not
take any non-JD students into account.
20 See infra Section II.B for discussion on the Comparison Period. See infra Section II.C for
discussion on the number of accredited schools during the Comparison Period and the composition of the sample group we used in this study.
21 See The LSAT, LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, https://www.lsac.org/jd/lsat/about-the-lsa
t [https://perma.cc/HF76-XN3N] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019); Derek T. Muller, Solving Law
School Admissions; Or, How U.S. News Distorts Student Quality, EXCESS DEMOCRACY
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2013/8/solving-law-school-admissionsor-how-us-news-distorts-student-quality [https://perma.cc/RB5K-Y359] [hereinafter Muller,
Law School Admissions]. An increasing number of law schools today are accepting scores on
the Graduate Record Exam (“GRE”) in lieu of LSAT scores, provided that the school can
demonstrate to the ABA that the GRE predicts success at its law school as reliably as the
LSAT. See ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS.
2018–2019, 33 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]; Kathryn Rubino, 25
Percent of Law Schools Say They Plan to Accept the GRE, ABOVE LAW (Sept. 18, 2017, 9:40
AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/09/25-percent-of-law-schools-say-they-plan-to-acceptthe-gre/ [https://perma.cc/EA4T-T3SS]; Stephanie Francis Ward, After Withdrawal of Law
School Admissions Test Rule Revision, Will Fewer Schools Accept the GRE?, ABA JOURNAL
(Aug. 9, 2018, 6:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/following_withdrawl_of_
admissions_test_rule_revision_will_fewer_schools_acc [https://perma.cc/LL7Y-W538]. The
ABA House of Delegates recently tabled a resolution to broaden the tests available to law
schools to include in their admissions process if they wished, see Ward, supra, but ABA
Standard 503 still requires “a valid and reliable admission test,” see ABA STANDARDS, supra, at 33, and thus some psychometrically standardized test score is part of almost every
application to almost every law school. During the Comparison Period, no law school accepted the GRE as an alternative to the LSAT—the first, the University of Arizona, did not
even start to try until 2016. Paul Caron, Arizona Is First Law School to Admit Students Based
on GRE Instead of LSAT, TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 11, 2016), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxpr
of_blog/2016/02/arizona-is-first-law-school-to-admit-students-based-on-gre-instead-of-lsat.h
tml [https://perma.cc/8RDU-HQ45]. Accordingly, our quantitative study uses LSAT scores
(along with UGPA) exclusively to describe students’ conventional qualifications.
22 For an explanation of the quantitative measure of a law-school’s overall student Profile
developed and used in this study, see infra Section II.D.1. For data on selectivity, including
numbers of applications, acceptances, and matriculants by school, see the ABA Required
Disclosures webpage. Standard 509 Disclosure, ABA, http://www.abarequireddisclosures.or
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are consistently associated with law schools that enjoy stronger Reputations for
overall quality, in part because these criteria tend to select stronger students
who are in greater demand among more lucrative and prestigious employers,23
and in part because LSAT and UGPA together account for 22.5 percent of the
law-school rankings published annually in U.S. News and World Report, which
is (for better or worse) an influential and widely relied-upon measure of relative
reputation for overall quality.24
Most students also are selective in choosing the law schools to which they
apply and matriculate. While individual preferences can vary, applicants generally decide to attend the law school with the best general Reputation for overall
quality—balanced against the lowest cost of attendance and geographical familiarity and convenience—that their credentials can bring them. As a result,
the scholarships and other cost discounts that a law school may be willing to
offer become a significant factor in many students’ decisions.25
Law schools are required to publish a Base Tuition or “sticker price,”26 but
many applicants’ actual tuition is less than sticker price because of the scholarships law schools offer. Law schools also are required to publish the number of
students across the entire student body who have received grants or scholarships, which can give prospective students some idea of their own chances for
g/Disclosure509.aspx [https://perma.cc/2RKR-VDA7] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019) (select the
year and the First-Year Class Section from the “Compilation—All Schools” box on the lower right).
23 See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
24 See Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines, Methodology: 2019 Best Law School Rankings, U.S.
NEWS (Mar. 19, 2018, 9:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/
articles/law-schools-methodology [https://perma.cc/3ML4-Q4SB]. Despite their many shortcomings and deep unpopularity in the academy, the U.S. News rankings are quite explicitly
relied upon by most prospective law students in setting their priorities and making their
choices in law school applications and matriculation. See infra note 80; see also Muller, Law
School Admissions, supra note 21. Thus, whether or not they accurately reflect some measurable underlying reality, see infra Section II.F, they are a good measure of law schools’ relative Reputation for overall quality.
25 See Jerome M. Organ, Net Tuition Trends by LSAT Category from 2010 to 2014 with
Thoughts on Variable Return on Investment, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 51, 74 (2017) (discussing
the relative importance tuition discounts may have for students with different qualifications)
[hereinafter Organ, Net Tuition]. See generally, GALLUP & ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., BEFORE
THE JD: UNDERGRADUATE VIEWS ON LAW SCHOOL 54 fig.8.1 (2018) (noting that among over
2700 first-year law students from over eighty law schools, location, reputation and financial
support offered were three of the five most important criteria in selecting law school (along
with employment outcomes and quality of faculty)); Christopher J. Ryan, Analyzing Law
School Choice 20 tbl.4 (Working Paper No. 186, 2019) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c
fm?abstract_id=3309815 [https://perma.cc/BH3U-C8GN] (noting that among students at
four different types of law schools, two of the most significant factors that influenced choice
of law school were reputation and financial aid (along with job placement)).
26 See infra note 44 and accompanying text. The term “sticker price” is in widespread use in
law-school admissions circles, and reflects the strong analogies between Base Tuition and
automobile sticker price—namely that both are published nominal prices from which many
prospective purchasers negotiate downward.
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scholarship aid.27 At the vast majority of law schools, scholarships are based on
“merit” rather than student need, with schools competing for the “best” students
as measured principally by LSAT and UGPA.28
In short, these facts describe a market in which law schools are sellers, and
law students are buyers, of a specific service: legal education intended to eventuate in a JD degree. It is a somewhat unusual market: In general, sellers are
indifferent to the characteristics of their buyers (other than ability to pay), but
law-school sellers care deeply about the characteristics of their prospective student buyers. Law schools will negotiate price (that is, discount tuition) for accepted applicants with certain measurable characteristics, namely LSAT and
UGPA credentials that are above the actual or aspirational median for that law
school.29 Nonetheless, it also is an economic market in which buyers care deeply about price and perceived value. The next section will describe a recent
shock to this market—the significant decline in demand during the period following 2010—and will explore how that shock affected the market and its participants.
B. The Market Shock of 2010
From the 1970s until 2008, with a brief dip in the early 2000s, the entrylevel job market for new law graduates grew steadily. The number of lawschool applicants and matriculants grew comparably, with some ebbs and
flows.30 Figure 1.1 on the following page illustrates these trends.
27

See infra notes 44, 47, 65, and accompanying text.
See Jerome Organ, How Scholarship Programs Impact Students and the Culture of Law
School, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 173, 183 n.15 (2011) (noting that for the 160 law schools on
which information was available only seven offered need-based scholarships) [hereinafter
Organ, Scholarship Programs]; LSSSE Annual Results 2016: Types of Scholarship Awards
(Part 1), LSSSE (Apr. 10, 2017), http://lssse.indiana.edu/blog/lssse-annual-results-2016-type
s-of-scholarship-awards-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/P629-YMDU] (noting that 79 percent of
scholarships awarded were merit-based that year).
29 See Organ, Scholarship Programs, supra note 28, at 183–85 (discussing use of conditional scholarship programs to attract the highest possible entering class profile); Organ, Net Tuition, supra note 25, at 55–64 (describing pricing pressures particularly on law schools with
LSAT medians of 150–59, which saw net tuition decline over 10 percent between 2010 and
2014); Muller, Law School Admissions, supra note 21 (describing admission process in
which law schools refrain from admitting students whose LSAT and GPA indicators are just
below the schools’ reported medians, opting to admit students with one indicator above the
median even if the other indicator is further below the median).
30 Figure 1.1 tracks “Law Jobs,” defined as full-time, long-term jobs requiring a law license
and excluding solo practice and positions funded by the graduate’s law school. The reasons
underlying this definition are presented in Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New
Normal: The Evolving Market for New Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
541, 547–50, 555–63 (2014) [hereinafter Burk, New Normal]. The source for the Law Jobs
information is the employment outcomes data self-reported by accredited law schools and
gathered by the National Association for Law Placement (“NALP”) and the ABA since the
1970s, selecting Law Jobs by the methodology described in Burk, New Normal, supra, at
550. The source for the applicant and matriculant data is also data self-reported by accredited
28
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FIGURE 1.1: NUMBER OF LAW JOBS, LAW-SCHOOL APPLICANTS, AND LAW-SCHOOL
MATRICULANTS 2000–17

As Figure 1.1 also illustrates, following the onset of the Great Recession in
2008, entry-level legal hiring dropped precipitously.31 The number of applilaw schools and gathered by NALP and the ABA, as well as data gathered and reported by
the Law School Admissions Council (“LSAC”).
31 See Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27–39 (2011)
[hereinafter Burk & McGowan, Big but Brittle]. The reasons for these reductions was only in
part attributable to the cyclical effects of the Great Recession. Structural pressures on the
way that complex legal services were staffed and priced that had begun to build years previously took hold as hard times forced more clients to rethink their legal costs. See Burk, New
Normal, supra note 30, at 581–99. Though the Great Recession has been over for quite some
time and unemployment generally is at historic lows, the number of Law Jobs is still down
26 percent from 2007, and with the structural forces exerting downward pressure on the hiring of new lawyers ever more firmly taking hold, there is no good reason to believe that the
Law Job market will grow any faster than Gross Domestic Product for the foreseeable future.
See Bernard A. Burk, The New Normal Ten Years In: The Job Market for New Lawyers Today and What It Means for the Legal Academy Tomorrow, 12 FLA. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).

19 NEV. L.J. 583, BURK ET AL.

596

4/25/2019 8:25 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:2

cants to law school increased in 2009 and 2010, resulting in the largest aggregate entering class in American history in the fall of 2010 with roughly 52,500
first-year students.32 By 2010, large firms’ layoffs of thousands of junior associates and cutbacks in new hiring were front-page news and had become apparent to college seniors and recent graduates considering law school.33 As a result, both law-school applications and entering-class Sizes began to drop
steeply. Between 2010 and 2015, the number of unique applicants to law school
per year fell 36 percent, and the total number of applications dropped 44 percent.34
Not only did the number of applicants to law school decrease, so did their
conventional qualifications. Stronger students with higher test scores, who
probably had the most varied and attractive alternatives to law school, disproportionately stayed away compared to weaker applicants.35 Figure 1.2 illustrates these trends, focusing on applicants in three LSAT categories.
32

Am. Bar. Ass’n Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963–2012, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrat
ive/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YSA8-XSMD] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). This small surge was typical of
the response following all recessions from the 1970s on as graduating college seniors sought
graduate and professional school as a shelter from an inhospitable employment market. See
Burk, New Normal, supra note 30, at 565 figs. 2.1–2.2.
33 See Burk & McGowan, Big but Brittle, supra note 31, at 28–36 and authorities cited.
34 Applicants and applications dropped precipitously year-over-year in 2011, 2012, and
2013 (-10.7%/-11.4%; -13.5%/-12.3%; -12.4%/-17.8%). See Appendix II. Both continued to
fall less drastically in 2014 and 2015 (-6.3%/-8.0%; -2.2%/-4.2%). Id. By 2016, applicants
and applications, as well as new matriculants, had finally levelled out—they actually rose
slightly in 2016, although 2016 might have reflected a “false positive” as LSAC started reporting full-year applicant volume rather than fall applicant volume. Admission Trends: ABA
Applicants, Admitted Applicants, and Applications, LSAC, https://www.lsac.org/lsacresource
s/data/aba-eoy [https://perma.cc/2T5M-VRQR] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). Applicants and
applications were up by about 7.6 percent for fall 2018, id., a phenomenon that an LSAT
test-preparation organization’s survey suggests was prompted by a sudden increase in graduating college students’ interest in involving themselves in the political events of the day rather than any sense that employment opportunities might be expanding (and that any additional law students therefore might be able to achieve their ambitions for full-time political
engagement in the law when they graduate). See Jodi Teti, Are More Students Going to Law
School as a Reaction to Trump?, LSAT BLOG (Aug. 29, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://blueprintlsat.
com/lsatblog/law-school-2/students-going-law-school-reaction-trump/ [https://perma.cc/KV
Z6-28LA].
35 We will throughout this Article refer generally to “stronger” or “weaker” applicants and
students. This is a shorthand intended only for convenience to refer to students with higher
(or lower) LSAT scores and UGPAs. We use this shorthand both because it corresponds to
the measurable data we have, and because during this period most law-school admissions
committees relied heavily on these data to the near-exclusion of almost anything else. We in
no way intend to imply that LSAT and UGPA are all that is needed to predict whether an
applicant is capable of completing a JD at any particular institution or of passing any state’s
Bar Examination, let alone functioning as a practicing lawyer in any particular realm of practice. We believe that the ability to succeed in law school, or bar testing, or the legal profession calls upon a range of attributes, such as academic preparation in writing, numeracy and
critical reasoning; acculturation; work ethic (sometimes thought of as drive or “grit”); and
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FIGURE 1.2: HIGHEST LSAT SCORE CATEGORIES OF ABA APPLICANTS (COUNT) 2010–
2011 THROUGH 2017–1836

By the time the size of the applicant pool had leveled out, the landscape
had changed profoundly. As shown in the data presented in Appendix I, by the
2016–17 academic year, the average private American law school (based on the
110 law schools in our sample and weighted for class size) had:
• A median entering-class LSAT of 156, down from 158 in 2010, a drop
equivalent to 7 percentiles of the tested population;37

emotional and general innate intelligence, all in combination and in balance. See, e.g., Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the Basis
for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 620, 630 (2011) (identifying
twenty-six effectiveness factors that are indicative of successful lawyers); Phase One: Survey & Results, IAALS, http://iaals.du.edu/projects/foundations-practice/phase-one-survey-re
sults [https://perma.cc/J6CY-ZBS3] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (highlighting characteristics,
competencies and skills identified by lawyers as being essential for recent law school graduates to be successful). LSAT and UGPA appear to reflect at least a few of these things, at
least to some degree, but are primarily predictive of success in the first year of law school.
See, e.g., LISA C. ANTHONY ET AL., PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF THE LSAT: A NATIONAL
SUMMARY OF THE 2013 AND 2014 LSAT CORRELATION STUDIES 1 (2016).
36 Paul Caron, Updated LSAC Data on the Quantity and Quality of Law School Applicants,
TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 26, 2018), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2018/02/updated-ls
ac-data-on-the-quantity-and-quality-of-law-school-applicants.html [https://perma.cc/8ALYT678].
37 See infra Appendix I. As discussed infra note 60 and accompanying text, the LSAT’s
point-scoring scale does not translate to performance relative to other test-takers in linear
terms. In other words, the normalized scale corresponds to different proportions of the tested
population at different points on the scale. The one-point difference between 170 and 171 (or
130 and 131) on the LSAT’s 120-to-180 normalized point scale amounts to less than one
percentile; the difference between 150 and 151 amounts to nearly four percentiles. This ex-
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• An entering-class Size that was nearly one-third (31 percent) smaller than
in 2010, reduced by an average of ninety-two students per entering
class per school;
• Average actual tuition paid per student (“Net Tuition”) that was 6.4 percent less than it had been in 2010 (down from $35,251 in 2010 to
$32,985 in 2016, measured in constant 2018 dollars). While weighted
average Base Tuition “sticker price” rose 15 percent during the same
period (from $42,434 in 2010 to $49,007 in 2016, measured in 2018
dollars), the average scholarship discount per student had doubled (rising from 16.9 percent of Base Tuition in 2010 to 32.7 percent in 2016,
again in real 2018 dollars), and the number of students receiving scholarships had also increased by more than 10 percent.

As a result, from its inflation-adjusted peak in 2011–12 until 2016–17,
overall average Tuition Revenue fell over one-third (-35 percent). In constant
2018 dollars, we estimate that annual Tuition Revenue for all accredited law
schools in 2016–17 was over $1.5 billion less than it had been in 2011–12—an
average decrease of over $9 million in annual Tuition Revenue per law
school.38
Needless to say, these hardships were not distributed evenly across all law
schools.

plains the widely varying percentile differences for what might appear to be similar scaledpoint differences here and infra Table 1.1.
38 As shown infra Appendix I, Tuition Revenue in constant dollars peaked in 2011–12
(without inflation adjustment, it was slightly higher in 2012–13). Both discounting and class
contractions started somewhat gradually while Base Tuition generally continued to rise
about 4 percent per year in nominal dollars (a common figure across higher education). All
these figures are based on the sample used in this study of 110 accredited schools, described
infra Section II.C. For the reasons discussed there, we believe this sample is representative
of all accredited schools despite important gaps in our pricing data for the remaining eighty
or so schools. The Tuition Revenue-loss estimate for all accredited law schools offered in the
text is extrapolated from our sample group.
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TABLE 1.1: PERFORMANCE CHANGES OVER THE COMPARISON PERIOD IN
REPUTATIONALLY STRONGER VS. WEAKER PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS39
Metric
Median 1L
LSAT

1L Class
Size

Base
Tuition
Avg. Net
Tuition°
Avg.
Discount°
Tuition
Revenue
(millions)°

Reputation
Group40
Stronger
Middle
Weaker
Stronger

2010−1141

2016−17

Change

166
156
151
11,133

164
152
147
9,689

Middle

10,523

6,865

Weaker

10,885

5,833

Stronger
Middle
Weaker
Stronger
Middle
Weaker
Stronger
Middle
Weaker
Stronger
Middle
Weaker

49,225
41,400
35,580
39,787
34,252
30,974
9,438
7,148
4,606
1,349
970
958

56,595
45,492
39,817
37,772
28,914
29,231
18,823
16,577
10,585
1,129
554
507

-2 points = -3 percentiles
-4 points = -15 percentiles
-4 points = -14 percentiles
-13% = -39 students/
entering class
-35% = -102 students/
entering class
-46% = -136 students/
entering class
+15%
+10%
+12%
-5%
-16%
-6%
+99%
+132%
+130%
-16% = -$5.9 million/school
-43% = -$11.6 million/school
-47% = -$12.2 million/school

As Table 1.1 shows, the Reputationally Stronger law schools generally suffered least, while on many metrics Reputationally Middle law schools suffered
most (though the Reputationally Weaker law schools often suffered almost as
badly, or worse). For example, over the course of the Comparison Period, Reputationally Middle and Weaker law schools lost on average twice as many
LSAT points, and about five times as many LSAT percentiles, as the Reputationally Stronger ones. Reputationally Middle law schools shrank their entering-class Size on average more than twice as much as Reputationally Stronger
ones, while Reputationally Weaker law schools shrank theirs on average more
than three times as much. Financially, while almost all law schools consistently
raised their Base Tuition in excess of inflation year after year, average Net Tuition paid per student actually fell 5 to 6 percent in real dollars over the Comparison Period at both the Stronger and Weaker schools Reputationally, with a
much greater average decrease of 16 percent among Reputationally Middle law
39

The data from which these findings are derived and set out infra Appendix I.
The third of the sample with the highest (Stronger), Middle, or lowest (Weaker) Reputation Score. See infra Section II.E.
41 Tuition Revenue is for the 2011–12 academic year because that is the year Tuition Revenue peaked. See supra note 38.
 Dollar figures in constant 2018 dollars.
40
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schools.42 And while Base Tuition rose, even the Reputationally Stronger law
schools on average doubled their average tuition discounts over the course of
the Comparison Period, while Reputationally Middle and Weaker law schools
increased their discounting on average by even more—about 130 percent. As a
result, Tuition-Revenue losses per school between 2011 and 2016 were twice as
great for the Reputationally Middle and Weaker law schools (-$11.6 and -$12.2
million per year per school, respectively, measured in constant 2018 dollars)
than they were for the Reputationally Stronger (-$5.9 million per year per
school, measured in constant 2018 dollars). All in six short years.43
It would be no exaggeration to call these changes sudden, enormous, and
drastic.
These rapid and dramatic changes in demand, their substantial practical
and economic effects on law schools, and their varying effects across the acad42

As discussed in more detail below, the most surprising result to emerge from our examination of the legal academy in Reputational sectors is that, during a time when the number of
applicants to law school fell dramatically, a number of the least-well-reputed law schools in
the country managed to discount only modestly, maintain, or even raise the average Net Tuition their students actually paid, while many better-regarded law schools were forced to discount tuition substantially. See supra Table 1.1; infra Section III.B.3.
43 Notably, the downturn has affected the number of law schools that remain in operation,
even though some of the closures occurred after 2016. The Hamline University School of
Law merged with the William Mitchell College of Law in 2015 to form Mitchell Hamline
School of Law. See Josh Verges, William Mitchell, Hamline Law School Merger OK’d,
TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Dec. 17, 2015, 5:13 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2015/12/
08/william-mitchell-hamline-law-school-merger-okd/ [https://perma.cc/K3R7-SLPJ]. We
thus excluded both from our sample given that we did not have data to analyze through 2016
for each law school. In addition, although the Charlotte School of Law did not announce its
closure until August 2017, because grant and scholarship data is reported on a one-year delay, we didn’t have grant and scholarship information for Charlotte for 2016 (it did not report
such data in December 2017 since it had closed) and therefore excluded Charlotte from our
sample as well. See Elizabeth Olson, For-Profit Charlotte School of Law Closes, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/business/dealbook/for-profit-charlott
e-school-of-law-closes.html [https://perma.cc/3G4T-CNYR]. But more recently, three other
law schools that were part of the Reputationally Weaker set of law schools within our sample are now closed or closing, including Whittier (April 2017), see Elizabeth Olson, Whittier
Law School Says It Will Shut Down, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/04/19/business/dealbook/whittier-law-school-to-close.html [https://perma.cc/SGN7-Y4
NU]; Valparaiso (October 2018), see Emma Whitford, Another Law School Will Close,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/31/valpar
aiso-law-school-will-close-following-unsuccessful-attempt-transfer-middle [https://perma.cc
/W9V6-ZPQ3]; and Arizona Summit (October 2018), see Anne Ryman, Arizona Summit
Law School Details Plans to Eventually Close Its Doors, AZCENTRAL (Oct. 25, 2018, 4:04
PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-education/2018/10/25/arizona-su
mmit-law-school-details-plans-close-its-doors/1763964002/ [https://perma.cc/W3YH-2KV5
]. In addition, one school, Indiana Tech, that was not in our database because it never received full accreditation, also announced in October 2016 that it was closing. See Fatima
Hussein, Indiana Tech Will Shut Down Law School, INDYSTAR (Nov. 1, 2016, 12:32 PM), htt
ps://www.indystar.com/story/news/education/2016/10/31/indiana-tech-shut-down-law-schoo
l/93063296/ [https://perma.cc/4NGE-748Q].
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emy together raise the question whether we can identify groups of law schools
whose characteristics predict the nature or extent of their reaction to the market
shock. As we will see, the answer is that we can, and that some of those trends
turn out to be surprising. The next Part discusses the data and methods we used
to discern those trends.
II. DATA AND METHODS
A. The American Bar Association’s Disclosure Requirements for Accredited
Law Schools
Among the Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools
the ABA has promulgated (the “ABA Standards”) are a number requiring each
accredited American law school to self-report annually to the ABA and to the
public a range of information concerning its program, students, and educational
outcomes, as well as students’ employment outcomes during the ten months after their graduation.44
Law schools have been required since before 2010 to disclose annually
their numbers of applicants, numbers of matriculants, and matriculants’ median, 25th-, and 75th-percentile LSAT scores and UGPA for each entering class,
both full-time and part-time.45 While Base Tuition is reported in the current
44

ABA Standard 509(b) currently requires each accredited law school to
publicly disclose on its website . . : (1) admissions data; (2) tuition and fees, living costs, and financial aid; (3) conditional scholarships; (4) enrollment data, including academic, transfer, and
other attrition; (5) numbers of full-time and part-time faculty, professional librarians, and administrators; (6) class sizes for first-year and upper-class courses; number of seminar, clinical and
co-curricular offerings; (7) employment outcomes; and (8) bar passage data.

ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 35–36. The scope and detail of demographic, operational, and employment-outcome information that the ABA has required law schools to disclose
has evolved over time, and has expanded considerably since 2009, especially as to conditional scholarships (that is, scholarships whose continuation after the first year is conditioned
on something in addition to academic good standing) and employment outcomes. For discussion of use and reporting of conditional scholarships, see generally Jerome M. Organ, Better
Understanding the Scope of Conditional Scholarship Programs Among American Law
Schools (Sep. 27, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2288915 [https://perma.cc/ELJ2-CAVZ].
For a history of law-school disclosure requirements regarding employment outcomes, see
Burk, New Normal, supra note 30, at 550–53. For more specific details about what data disclosures are currently required, see Questionnaires & Applications, ABA, https://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/questionnaire.html [https://perma.cc/YWE4-D
U72] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) [hereinafter 2017–18 ABA Questionnaire]. The actual data
disclosed as required by Standard 509, by school, for each year beginning 2010–11 may be
found at Standard 509 Disclosure, supra note 22.
45
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 35–36 (referencing admissions data and enrollment
data). Our 2010 application and admissions data were obtained from the hardcopy 2012
ABA-LSAC Official Guide (which was published in the summer of 2011 based on information reported in the Annual Questionnaire from the fall of 2010). See generally LAW SCH.
ADMISSIONS COUNCIL & AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, 2012 EDITION (2012)
[hereinafter 2012 ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE]. Our 2011−2016 data was obtained from the
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year, law schools report grants and scholarships one-year delayed, and are required to report grant and scholarship data only across all enrolled students, not
class-by-class (though grant and scholarship disclosures do distinguish between
full-time and part-time students as separate groups).46
We have been forced to estimate the amounts of discounting from Base Tuition by grants and scholarships at each law school because law schools are required to report grants and scholarships only in intervals. Specifically (and separately for full-time and part-time students as groups), the ABA since 2011
requires disclosure of only the total number of students receiving a grant or
scholarship in any amount, the number of students receiving less than 50 percent of Base Tuition, the number receiving between 50 percent and 100 percent
of Base Tuition, and the number of students receiving 100 percent or more of
Base Tuition; as well as the 25th-, 50th-, and 75th-percentile grant amounts.47
Accordingly, we calculate each school’s estimated average “Net Tuition” (that
is, its average grant-adjusted tuition) per student each year based on the
school’s entire student body.48

information on the ABA’s Standard 509 Required Disclosures website. Standard 509 Disclosure, supra note 22.
46 See 2017–18 ABA Questionnaire, supra note 44 (found in Part I, Part IV questionnaires).
All data of interest are disclosed separately for full-time and part-time students. As a result,
we were able to carry out our analysis on full-time and part-time students combined. In most
cases, the changes in Profile, Size and Net Tuition, see infra Section II.D, during the Comparison Period were broadly similar whether we used the combined data, or just data on fulltime students. We were particularly concerned about Net Tuition, because part-time tuition is
typically less per year than full-time tuition, though part-time students often pay more in total for the degree because they must enroll for four rather than three years. A school that increased its part-time enrollment relative to full-time over the course of the Comparison Period would appear to have reduced its average Net Tuition per student simply because parttime students pay less per year, even though the law school had enrolled more students, and
was realizing more Tuition Revenue. However, the correlations relied on in this study, see
discussion infra Part III, did not materially change when we used only full-time students or
when we equalized part-time Net Tuition to account for the fact that it is spread over four
rather than three years. Thus, any material distortion resulting from lower annual part-time
tuition does not appear to present itself in this dataset. Accordingly, we use the combined
full-time and part-time data without normalizing the part-time data in any way because they
are used both by the ABA for accreditation purposes and by publications such as U.S. News
for ranking purposes, and also to avoid any possible opportunistic classification by a reporting school.
47 See 2017–18 ABA Questionnaire, supra note 44 (found in Part IV questionnaire). Before
2011, schools were required to disclose even less—only Base Tuition, median grant
amounts, and the total number of students with and without grants. See infra note 66.
48
See infra Section II.D.3 for the estimation formula we have used. As with our admissions
and matriculation data, our 2010 tuition data were obtained from the hardcopy 2012 ABALSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, supra note 45, and our 2011–16 tuition data were obtained from the
Required Disclosure Information on the ABA’s Standard 509 Required Disclosures website,
Standard 509 Disclosure, supra note 22. The grants and scholarship information were obtained from the 2011 to 2017 Required Disclosure Information as they are reported on a oneyear delayed basis. Id.
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B. The Comparison Period
Our Comparison Period begins with the 2010–11 academic year, which for
most accredited American law schools represents an historical high-water mark
for law-school admissions in terms of the Size and Profile of the entering class.
That year also marks the beginning of the market shock in legal education resulting from the collapse of the job market for new law graduates a couple of
years earlier.49
The Comparison Period ends with the 2016–17 academic year, by which
time the market shock and its effects had for the most part stabilized, and
schools generally had adjusted to a “new normal” in demand.50
C. The Law Schools Comprising Our Dataset
The law schools on whose data we rely in this study comprise 110 private
law schools that were fully accredited continuously during the Comparison Period.51 We very much would have liked to have included all law schools, both
public and private, that were fully accredited throughout the Comparison Period. Unfortunately, public law schools charge different levels of Base Tuition to
in-state and out-of-state residents, but are not required to (and typically do not)
disclose how many students of each category attend the school in any given
year.52 Moreover, we have no confidence that public law schools in different
49

See supra Sections I.A, I.B, and Figure 1.1; see also infra Appendix I.
See supra Section I.A, Figure 1.1; see also infra Appendix I. We acknowledge that the
number of law-school applicants increased by about 8 percent in 2018–19, with first-year
enrollment increasing about 3 percent to roughly 38,400. See Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, New Data Confirm Boost in Law School Attendance, ht
tps://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2018/12/new-data-confirms-b
oost-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/A6GF-DDX7] (last visited on Feb. 18, 2019); see also,
Jerry Organ, Analyzing Enrollment and Profile Patterns Across Different Tiers of Law
Schools for Fall 2018, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 2, 2019), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_bl
og/2019/01/analyzing-enrollment-and-profile-patterns-across-different-tiers-of-law-schools-f
or-fall-2018.html [https://perma.cc/ZU6N-N3DK]. But the number of entry-level law jobs
has remained flat, and shows no indication it will return to the levels prevailing ten or even
twenty years ago for many years. See supra note 31 (expressing doubt whether the entrylevel employment market would be able to accommodate a larger graduating class). We concur with the National Association for Law Placement in questioning the wisdom of admissions policies that expand entering classes without regard to the availability of Law Jobs for
the additional graduates that will result. See Karen Sloan, Job Market for Law Grads ‘Surprisingly Strong,’ NALP Finds, LAW.COM (Aug. 1, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.law.com/20
18/08/01/job-market-for-law-grads-surprisingly-strong-nalp-finds/ [https://perma.cc/N2BTG2KK].
51 The sample excludes programs that existed or were accredited for only part of the Comparison Period, or that merged with another law school during the Comparison Period making continuous quantitative comparison impossible, see supra note 43, but includes law
schools that changed name or ownership only. It also excludes three law schools located in
Puerto Rico, as they serve a different market.
52 This omission is further complicated by the fact that some states make it relatively easy
for out-of-state students to qualify for in-state Base Tuition by their second year, while oth50
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states and with different Reputations for quality have similar proportions of instate and out-of-state students, or even that a given public law school would
have the same proportion of in-state and out-of-state students over time.53 It
therefore is impossible to determine average tuition per student (either at Base
Tuition or grant-adjusted Net Tuition) reliably at a public law school. Because,
as we will see, a law school’s decisions on Net Tuition are a critical factor in
quantifying its market performance, and we were unable to reliably estimate
average Net Tuition per student at public law schools, we regretfully and regrettably were forced to omit all public law schools from our analysis.54
We do, however, have good reason to believe that our sample is representative. The sample size is quite substantial—110 law schools all over the country
and including institutions across the entire range of Reputation for quality. As
noted in Appendix II, matriculants at private law schools represent just less
than two-thirds of the total at all accredited law schools, with this ratio remaining relatively stable throughout the Comparison Period. The same is broadly
true of the total number of JD students (all classes), and the total number of applications for law schools in our sample as compared with all accredited law
schools.55 Moreover, the size and direction of the aggregate changes in entering-class Size and Profile for the law schools in our sample group during the
Comparison Period are well correlated with those for all accredited law schools
as a whole.56 Thus, while the data currently available do not allow us to prove
that changes in actual average Net Tuition per student at our sample law
schools are well correlated with such changes in all accredited law schools over
the Comparison Period, the sample’s comparable performance over all other
relevant variables suggests that they are.
ers make it quite difficult, so students can change residency status year-to-year in ways that
are not generalizable across all public law schools.
53 What little information is available publicly suggests that there is significant variability,
with resident percentages ranging from as low as 20 percent to as high as 78 percent in a
sample of five public law schools with published residency information. Michigan (20 percent), Class Statistics, MICH. LAW, https://www.law.umich.edu/prospectivestudents/Pages/cl
assstatistics.aspx [https://perma.cc/SQT2-5W55] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); UCLA (58 percent), UCLA Law Incoming Class Profile, UCLA LAW, https://law.ucla.edu/admissions/class
-profile/ [https://perma.cc/35TP-QDUL] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Kansas (64 percent),
2018 Entering Class Profile, KU SCH. LAW, https://law.ku.edu/profile [https://perma.cc/THG
3-ZPET] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Memphis (72 percent), Memphis Law Entering Class
Profile: Class of 2021, UNIV. MEMPHIS, https://www.memphis.edu/law/documents/factsheet_
2018_19_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH8K-48G8] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Florida (78
percent), Entering Class Profile, LEVIN C. LAW, https://www.law.ufl.edu/admissions/apply/e
ntering-class-profile [https://perma.cc/VM88-5WPW] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
54 Our dataset also excludes Brigham Young University because, consistent with its religious mission, it offers different Base Tuition to Mormon and non-Mormon students, but
does not reveal the proportion of students allocated each Base Tuition amount. Tuition,
BYU, https://finserve.byu.edu/content/tuition-and-general-fees [https://perma.cc/ZWX7-R3
YR] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
55 See infra Appendix II.
56 See infra Appendix II.
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D. The Variables that Describe a Law School’s Performance as a Seller in the
Market for Legal Education
While, as we will show, overall general Reputation for quality is an important factor driving outcomes in the market for legal education, it does not
directly describe an individual school’s performance in the market. We assume
that, all else being equal, on a year-over-year basis, the typical law school
would like to maintain (or increase) both its gross Tuition Revenue and its student-qualification metrics (“Profile”). But with application numbers and average applicant Profiles falling after 2010, most law schools had to make hard
decisions: Law schools could attempt to maintain Profile at the cost of enteringclass Size and/or average Net Tuition, thus sacrificing Revenue. Or they could
attempt to maintain Revenue by maintaining class Size and average Net Tuition, but enrolling weaker students and giving up Profile. Or they could do
some combination of both, giving up some Revenue (by shrinking enteringclass Size and/or discounting average Net Tuition), and also giving up some on
Profile, while trying to minimize erosion on both parameters as much as possible.57
We thus isolated three “Performance Variables”:
1. Profile
A law school’s student Profile (that is, the aggregate credentials of its entering class) is of great importance to applicants and law schools alike because
both assume (largely correctly) that higher-Profile schools have better Reputations for overall quality, and tend to have both better bar passage rates and better job prospects after graduation.58 As discussed above, LSAT and UGPA
comprise 22.5 percent of a school’s U.S. News ranking—a widely used proxy
for Reputation on which most prospective law students rely in choosing among
the schools that have accepted them.59 It is not difficult to infer from these facts
that law schools seek out applicants with strong credentials not only because
they believe those credentials provide some predictive value for academic and
57

See infra Section III.A.
See Organ, Net Tuition, supra note 25, at 58–59; Aaron N. Taylor, Diversity as a Law
School Survival Strategy, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 321, 332–33 (2015); Bill Henderson, How the
“Cravath System” Created the Bi-Modal Distribution, EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES (July 18,
2008, 2:14 AM), https://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2008/07/how-the-cravat
h.html [https://perma.cc/Z86P-E3BN]; see also Ilana Kowarski, Why Big Law Firms Care
About Which Law School You Attend, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2018, 10:39 AM), https://www.usn
ews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2018-08-01/why-big-lawfirms-care-about-which-law-school-you-attend [https://perma.cc/27WA-2EG2].
59 As discussed below, see infra notes 74, 80, and accompanying text, our reliance on U.S.
News rankings reflects our understanding not that they are methodologically sound or accurately reflect some underlying objective reality, but simply that they both reflect and reinforce a widespread understanding of (that is, Reputation for) quality and desirability in the
relevant market among actual buyers in that market-prospective law students.
58
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bar exam performance as well as future practice success, but because they
strengthen the law school’s Reputation and attract other stronger students in a
virtuous cycle.
We measured Profile by creating a normalized score combining LSAT and
UGPA for each sample law school’s entering class in a given year. Specifically,
we first converted each school’s median scores (on the 120-to-180-point scale
on which LSAC reports them) to their percentile equivalent (“P-LSAT”), using
data provided by LSAC and based on all test takers over rolling three-year periods.60 For UGPA, there are no equivalent percentile measures, so we simply
normalized median percentile UGPA scores to a 100-point scale (“N-UGPA”).
For purposes of comparing changes in Profile over the Comparison Period, we
then combined these LSAT and UGPA scores into a single overall Profile score
for each year that weighted P-LSAT 55 percent and N-UGPA 45 percent.61
Thus we calculate each school’s Profile in each year as follows:
Profile62 = 0.45(median N-UGPA) + 0.55(median P-LSAT)
60

The conversion of LSAT scores to a percentile of the tested population is intended to
make the LSAT’s nonlinear scoring scale linear and expose the true relative magnitude of
many of the changes that occurred. Cambridge LSAT reports conversions of LSAT-scaled
scores to percentiles on a rolling three-year basis. LSAT Percentiles Table, CAMBRIDGE
LSAT, https://www.cambridgelsat.com/resources/data/lsat-percentiles-table/ [https://perma.c
c/F2XU-BDPZ] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019). The graph below shows the conversion in 2009–
12. Graphs for subsequent three-year windows are almost identical, although there was a
very small decline in average test scores across all candidates between 2009–12 and 2012–
15. For example, a test taker scoring 156 during 2009–12 was in the 66.7th percentile, while
the same score for 2012–15 was in the 67.0th percentile. Data on scaled-to-percentile conversions that include 2016 test takers are not yet publicly available.
FIGURE 2.1: LSAT VS PERCENTILE: 2009–12
LSAT vs Percentile: 2009 - 2012
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This weighting reflects the relative weight we believe that admissions officers place on
these metrics because of the relative weight accorded these factors in the U.S. News rankings. We also carried out all of our analysis using various alternative measures of Profile,
trying weightings of 25th-, median, and 75th-percentile LSAT scores, Percentile-LSATs and
UGPAs. None of these differences had any significant effect on our quantitative results, and
thus do not affect the qualitative discussion.
62 We used this formula separately on full-time and part-time enrolled students, and then
calculated composite Profile as a weighted average of full time and part time Profiles (with
the weights being the number of entering students in the full-time vs. part-time programs at
each school).
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The focus of this study is to quantify and compare the change in each of
the Performance Variables over the course of the Comparison Period (2010–16)
in response to the market shock of 2010. A particular law school’s percentage
change in Profile over the Comparison Period (“ΔProfile”) is then simply:
ΔProfile = (2016 Profile / 2010 Profile) - 1

Where we discuss the status of or changes in the legal academy overall,
each law school’s entering-class composite LSATs and UGPAs, respectively,
are combined in a weighted average for each year. Using a weighted average
more closely approximates the overall pool of matriculants because a linear average would give law schools with smaller enrollments the same weight as law
schools with larger enrollments. In other words, without a weighted average,
smaller schools’ students would each be accorded greater relative weight than
larger law schools’ in the overall average.
For example, the weighted average (“WA”) Median LSAT (“MedLSAT”)
for all schools in our sample in a given year would be calculated as:
WA MedLSAT = Σi (MedLSATi x Sizei) / Σi (Size), across all schools i
Where Sizei = size of the matriculating class at school i63

2. Size
Size is simply the total number of both full-time and part-time students in a
school’s entering first-year class in a given year. As demand (as measured by
the number of applicants) fell, it became more difficult for many law schools to
maintain the entering-class Size to which they were accustomed with the level
of Profile to which they were accustomed; there were no longer enough applicants with each school’s customary LSAT and UGPA to go around. Many law
schools were forced to consider trading off Size against Net Tuition and/or Profile—that is, to accept students with weaker-than-customary Profile in order to
maintain entering-class Size, or to “buy” students with stronger Profile by discounting tuition; or to accept a smaller entering-class Size in order to hold off
deterioration in Profile or Net Tuition. Thus changes in Size were one way that
individual schools coped with the sudden reduction in demand.64
We calculate percentage change in matriculating-class Size for each law
school over the course of the Comparison Period (“ΔSize”) as:
ΔSize = (2016 Size / 2010 Size) - 1

63

Accordingly, infra Appendix I includes weighted average LSAT scores and percentiles
for each year in the Comparison Period. Table 1.1 uses weighted averages for the data it presents. See supra Table 1.1.
64 Infra Appendix I contains aggregate entering-class Size for the academy as a whole, and
for sectors divided by stronger, middle, or weaker Reputation for quality, during the Comparison Period.
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3. Net Tuition
Unlike applicant, matriculant, and Profile measures (which law schools are
required to report for each matriculating class) law schools report tuition,
scholarships, and grants only across all enrolled students each year. Thus our
analysis of changes in Net Tuition is necessarily provided on a rolling basis
covering the entire student body.65
Schools report both Base Tuition and median grants and scholarships, as
well as the total number of students receiving no scholarship aid, grants of less
than 50 percent of tuition, grants of between 50 percent and 100 percent of tuition, and receiving 100 percent or more (a few students at some schools receive
assistance towards living expenses as well as a free ride on tuition).66 However,
both the numbers of students receiving grants and the size of the grants themselves as a percentage of Base Tuition changed between 2010 and 2016,67 making Base Tuition figures useless, if not misleading, as an approximation of the
65

Fortunately, our use of data from the entire student body at each school to estimate average actual Net Tuition paid per student each year may result in a more accurate estimate of
average Net Tuition and related metrics than would Net Tuition data from the entering class
alone. That is because these figures may change significantly for a particular student after
the first year given the conditional scholarship programs implemented at a number of law
schools during the Comparison Period. Using tuition and discount data for all students attending a school each year also allows the average Net Tuition estimate to reflect the actual
tuition paid by students transferring into the school after the first year (and eliminates the
effect of any scholarship recipient who transferred out) as well as accounting for any changes (up or down) in the amount of financial aid students may receive after the first year.
66 In 2011, schools started reporting 25th- and 75th-percentile grant amounts in addition to
the median. Because these breakdowns were not reported in 2010, we use only median
grants to estimate average Net Tuition in both 2010 and 2016 to maintain consistency. As a
check, we also separately estimated each school’s 2016 average Net Tuition based on 25thand 75th-percentile grants, and compared them to the 2016 average Net Tuition estimated
from median grants. The two series are very highly correlated (ρ = 96 percent), with an average difference of less than $2,000, suggesting that the true distribution of tuition grants likely
is reasonably symmetric at most schools.
Schools are also required to disclose an estimated cost of living while attending school. See
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 35 (requiring these disclosures in Standard 509(b)(2)).
Although cost of living obviously varies at different law schools in our sample, we elected
not to include these cost-of-living figures in our comparisons of the estimated cost of attendance. We did so for two reasons: First, the cost-of-living estimates the schools supply are
unreliable. Schools in the same urban metropolitan area differ in their estimates in a manner
that could skew the trends we are attempting to discern and describe. For example, cost of
living among law schools in Philadelphia in 2016 ranged from roughly $22,500 to more than
$25,500, and in New York, from roughly $20,000 to more than $27,000. See Standard 509
Disclosure, supra note 22. In addition, many applicants limit their applications locally or
regionally. GALLUP & ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., supra note 25, at 55 fig.8.2. (showing that
location of the law school was the top factor in considering where to apply to law school
across all first-year law students participating in the survey with LSATs less than 165).
These self-imposed limitations often result in many students with more than one acceptance
choosing among schools with comparable cost of living, making any differences less likely
to influence buying choices.
67 See supra Table 1.1, text accompanying notes 39–43.
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actual Net Tuition students are paying. Indeed, candidates with offers of acceptance from multiple law schools often negotiate tuition discounts by putting
law schools in competition with one other on the basis of grant amount.68 We
therefore analyze changes in average Net Tuition—the estimated amount the
average student actually paid—from 2010 to 2016.
To estimate average Net Tuition per student for each law school in a given
year, we multiply the law school’s median grant by the percentage of enrolled
students receiving a grant, and subtract this from the Base Tuition (“BT”).
Thus:
Net Tuition69 = BT - MedG x %G where
BT = Base Tuition;
MedG = median grant ($); and
%G = percentage of enrolled students who received grants

Accordingly, we can estimate the percentage change in average Net Tuition per student for a particular law school over the course of the Comparison
Period (“ΔNet Tuition”) as:
ΔNet Tuition = (2016 Net Tuition / 2010 Net Tuition) - 1

We also calculate weighted average (“WA”) Net Tuition across all law
schools in the sample in a given year, where the weights are the total numbers
of enrolled students at each school:
WA Net Tuition = Σi (Net Tuitioni x Censusi) / Σi (Census), across all law
schools i, where
Censusi = number of enrolled students at each law school i in the sample

The calculation for weighted average Base Tuition across all law schools in
a given year is, equivalently,
WA BT = Σi (BTi x Censusi) / Σi (Census), across all law schools i, where
Censusi = number of enrolled students at each law school i in the sample

Appendix I shows that weighted average Net Tuition across the entire legal
academy actually rose gradually early in the Comparison Period. This occurred
because, even in an environment of falling demand, most law schools still increased their Base Tuition each year by 4 percent in nominal dollars (with the
68

See, e.g., Christen Morgan, Ahead of the Curve: The Power of Negotiation: When Should
I Negotiate My Law School Scholarship Offer?, LAW SCHOOL TOOLBOX (Mar. 31, 2017), htt
ps://lawschooltoolbox.com/ahead-of-the-curve-the-power-of-negotiation-when-should-i-neg
otiate-my-law-school-scholarship-offer/ [https://perma.cc/R6Y4-6MT2].
69
As with Profile, see supra note 62, we used this formula separately for full-time and parttime students, and then calculated composite Net Tuition as a weighted average of full time
and part time Net Tuition (with the weights being the number of enrolled students in the fulltime vs. part-time programs). As discussed supra note 46, we combined full-time and parttime Net Tuition data without adjustment despite the fact that part-time tuition is generally a
lower amount per year paid for four rather than three years, because no material distortion
resulted from our doing so in this dataset.
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exception of 2015, when the weighted average increase was 3 percent nominally).70 The average annual increase in the median grant, however, was much
larger, and the number of students receiving grants increased as well.71 With
considerable variation in discounting across law schools, many law schools
were charging average Net Tuition lower than in prior years by early in the
Comparison Period. By 2014, nominal weighted average Net Tuition began to
go down overall (even before adjusting for inflation; in real terms the decline
began in 2013), despite consistent yearly increases in Base Tuition.72
E. Using Net Tuition to Estimate Tuition Revenue
We also estimate law schools’ total Tuition Revenue each academic year
by multiplying each law school’s estimated average Net Tuition per student by
the total number of enrolled students. We then estimate the total Tuition Revenue (“TR”) across all law schools as the sum of the individual law schools’ totals:
All Law Schools’ TR = Σi (Net Tuitioni x Censusi) where
Censusi = number of enrolled students at each law school i in the sample

As might be expected, year-on-year changes in Tuition Revenue follow a
trajectory similar to changes in average Net Tuition, especially in years for
which total enrollments remain somewhat stable. Declining enrollment and increasing discounting generate the first nominal Tuition Revenue decline in
2013–14, with the decline in real terms beginning in 2012–13. The most significant percentage drop in Tuition Revenue occurs in 2014–15, which is the first
year in which weighted average Net Tuition across all law schools is lower than
in the previous year.73

70

See infra Appendix I.
See infra Appendix I.
72 See infra Appendix I.
73 See infra Appendix I. Tuition Revenue is, for most schools, the most significant source of
operating income, but it is by no means the only one. Frank H. Wu, Where Law Schools Get
Their Money, ABOVE LAW (Oct. 3, 2013, 3:56 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2013/10/wherelaw-schools-get-their-money/ [https://perma.cc/3KMN-YVXR]. “Rainy Day” funds accumulated during better times, subsidies from the greater University of which the law school is a
part (or in the case of public institutions, from the state), fundraising, and endowment can all
be sources of operating funds, and we imagine (and are anecdotally informed) that quite a
few law schools depended on them more and more as the renewable resource of student tuition became scarcer. See id. In addition, the number of law schools offering alternative degrees and the number of students enrolled in alternative degree programs has increased during this period. Muller, supra note 19. The degree to which these sources are sustainable, or
conversely the degree to which increasing reliance on some of them undermines the economic sustainability of many of these institutions, is a question of quite literally existential importance.
71
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F. The Use and Measurement of Relative Reputation for Overall Quality in
this Study
In describing law schools’ performance in the market for legal education,
we must begin by stressing that we were not seeking to develop, nor do we offer our model as, a ranking system. Existing law-school ranking systems tend
to aggregate and weight different variables into an overall ordinal list designed
to evaluate relative general overall quality or, more accurately, relative reputation for overall quality, in the sense that an interested observer would say in
general terms that one school is “better” than another.74 We refer to this notion
as “Reputation.”
However, Reputation as just defined plays a critical role in this study: We
have found that a law school’s relative Reputational strength has a very significant effect on the school’s performance on various different metrics in the legal
education market. We hypothesize, quantify, and demonstrate those relationships below.75 But we pause here to examine the concept of Reputation and describe how we measure it for purposes of this study.
Reputation is quite important in many contexts, in essence because it can
often be used as a loose proxy for assessing the actual underlying attribute that

74

Ironically, the annual U.S. News rankings are published under the title “Best Law
Schools,” though the publication ranks three-quarters of them ordinally (listing the remainder with the notation “Rank Not Published”), and includes virtually every accredited law
school in the country. See Morse & Hines, supra note 24. Although it has varied over the
years, U.S. News generally combines scores derived from each school’s entering-class median LSAT (and after the Comparison Period ended, GRE) scores (12.5 percent), median
UGPA (10 percent), and Acceptance Rate (2.5 percent); a “Peer Assessment Score” based on
a survey of legal academics (25 percent), a separate assessment score based on a survey of
lawyers and judges (15 percent); a Placement Success score (20 percent, including employment at graduation (4 percent), employment at ten months (14 percent) and Bar Passage Rate
score (2 percent)); and a Faculty Resources score that assesses expenditures per student
(11.25 percent), the student-faculty ratio (3 percent), and Library Resources (0.75 percent).
Id. Other rankings systems combine similar or additional variables in similar or different
ways. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Ranking Law Schools with LSATs, Employment Outcomes, and Law Review Citations, 91 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 55, 56–57 (2015); Methodology,
ABOVE LAW, https://abovethelaw.com/law-school-rankings/top-law-schools/#methodology
[https://perma.cc/TTP2-P2JS] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (explaining the industry website
Above the Law’s ranking system, which weights Employment (30 percent) “Quality Jobs”
(30 percent); Education Cost (15 percent); Debt per Job (10 percent); the school’s graduates
as a percentage of Supreme Court and other federal court judges (5 percent each); and an
alumni survey (5 percent)). A recently proposed ranking system focuses solely on enteringclass LSAT and UGPA on the theory that the “best” students will predictably choose the
“best” schools. Christopher J. Ryan, Jr. & Brian L. Frye, A Revealed-Preferences Ranking of
Law Schools, 69 ALA. L. REV. 495, 498–99 (2017). As noted in this article, however, that
apparent “choice” is colored both by the Size of the entering class at a given law school and
by the Net Tuition the law school charges, which is why our analysis focuses on all three
performance variables. See supra notes 57–72 and accompanying text.
75 See infra Part III.
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is the subject of the reputation.76 If potential trading partners, or product or service sellers, have good reputations for quality or integrity, others may feel more
comfortable dealing with them, and actually may be willing to make economic
concessions to do so because the underlying attribute reputed has economic
value.77 That can be particularly important in consumer markets: Where gathering information about an intended purchase is economically inefficient or requires expertise beyond the buyer’s abilities (both of which are true in many
consumer markets, and emphatically true as to legal education), reputation provides some kind of substitute for direct personal knowledge, and may be the
only quality assessment available as a practical matter.78
Of course, reputation is always an imperfect substitute for direct
knowledge of the underlying attribute for all kinds of reasons. For example, the
truth can be concealed. Reputation can be manipulated, or based on information
that is incomplete or obsolete.79
76

This discussion would not be complete without the obligatory reference to Iago’s deeply
calculating invocation of “good name” as “the immediate jewel of [our] souls,” far more
valuable than mere pecuniary riches. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3. For a
more contemporary assessment, see, for example, Omri Ben-Shahar, Consumer Protection
Without Law, REGISTER, Summer 2010, at 26–27, 29–30; William P. Rogerson, Reputation
and Product Quality, 14 BELL J. ECON. 508, 508–09 (1983).
77 See, e.g., Paul N. Wilson & Ana M. Kennedy, Trustworthiness as an Economic Asset, 2
INT’L FOOD & AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 179, 181 (1999).
78 See Yonathan A. Arbel, Reputation Failure: Market Discipline and Its Limits 13 (Univ.
Ala. Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Res. Paper No. 3239995, 2018), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3239995 [https://perma.cc/56BH-FADS]; see also Oren
Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 756
(2008). To analogize, these are some of the reasons our rules of evidence allow evidence of
Reputation to be used as proof of the underlying attribute in some circumstances (but not
others). See FED. R. EVID. 404; FED. R. EVID. 405(a); FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
79 Consider, for example, in recent years, Bill Cosby, Lance Armstrong, Theranos, and
countless others great and small whose reputations were based on incomplete or misleading
information. Or as Iago himself put it, “Reputation is an idle and most false imposition, oft
got without merit and lost without deserving.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 2, sc. 3.
For a detailed and deeply insightful inquiry into how and why reputation can and not infrequently does diverge from underlying realities, see Arbel, supra note 78, at 25–32. Indeed,
law schools sometimes try to manipulate their entering-class Profiles because of their prominent role in determining U.S. News ranking, trading Profile for Size and/or Net Tuition, and
adding incremental students to the class in ways that do not degrade the Profile distributions
reported median and 25th percentile. See Muller, Law School Admissions, supra note 21.
That is one reason why we ground our analysis in three Performance Variables.
Several years ago, two law schools, Illinois and Villanova, went further in their efforts to
manipulate their entering-class Profiles, falsifying admissions data that resulted in sanctions
by the ABA. See COUNCIL OF THE SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO BAR OF THE
AM. BAR ASS’N, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF LAW CENSURE JUNE 2012 1 (2012), htt
ps://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions
_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/2012_june_u_illinois_public_censure.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/56MK-MV4T]; Martha Neil, ABA Raps Villanova re Inaccurate Admission Data, Says Law School Must Post Censure Online, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 15, 2011, 8:23 PM), ht
tp://www.abajournal.com/news/article/abas_legal_ed_section_sanctions_villanova/ [https://p
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As just discussed, here our concern is with individual law schools’ relative
overall general reputation for quality, in the sense that an interested observer
might say, without elaboration, that one school was “better” than another. A
more acute observer could suggest with considerable reason that talking about a
law school’s general overall quality might not make much sense. The concept
would appear to invoke only an imaginary abstraction of questionable utility.
After all, the underlying attribute—general overall quality—must draw on
many decidedly distinct, independent, and legitimately significant attributes,
evaluation of most of which likely varies a good deal from observer to observer
in nature and importance. Among others, these include quality of classroom instruction; quality and quantity of faculty scholarship; various qualities of the
students; quality of student life while attending; quality, variety, and specificity
of skills and clinical programs and instruction; quality and identity of concentration or certification programs; quality of the school’s placement function;
and so on. Just as importantly, different legitimately interested constituencies
(prospective law students; actual law students; law-school faculty and administrators at other schools; practitioners, judges, and prospective clients in the
communities where graduates practice; etc.) will have different priorities and
erma.cc/97HN-G88Z]. The ABA and LSAC agreed to a process which began in 2012 by
which LSAC would certify entering class credentials for law schools. See Letter from Susan
L. Krinsky, Chair, & Daniel O. Bernstine, President, Law School Admissions Council, to
Deans of LSAC Member Schools (Aug. 2, 2016), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/ca
/LSACMatriculantServiceDeans.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VCH-GNZZ].
One law school simply proposed its own ranking system. Elie Mystal, Latest Cooley Law
School Rankings Achieve New Heights of Intellectual Dishonesty, ABOVE LAW (Feb. 8, 2011,
6:23 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2011/02/latest-cooley-law-school-rankings-achieve-newheights-of-intellectual-dishonesty/ [http://perma.cc/EZH9-DHSX] [hereinafter Mystal, Latest
Cooley Rankings]. In 1996, Thomas M. Cooley Law School (now Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School) first proposed its own multifactor quality-ranking
system. Other Rankings, USLEGAL, https://lawschool.uslegal.com/law-school-rankings/other
-rankings/ [https://perma.cc/FAX2-ET4N] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). By 2009, it used that
system to tout itself as the twelfth-best law school in America. Elie Mystal, Cooley Law
School Develops More Useless Than Normal Law School Rankings, ABOVE LAW (Feb. 5,
2009, 11:08 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2009/02/cooley-law-school-develops-moreuseless-than-normal-law-school-rankings/ [https://perma.cc/Z4Z9-8QKG] [hereinafter Mystal, Cooley Develops Rankings]. By 2011, Thomas Cooley had ascended in its own ranking
system to No. 2 nationally, behind only Harvard. Paul L. Caron, Size Matters: Thomas Cooley’s 2011 Law School Rankings, TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 9, 2011), https://taxprof.typepad.com
/taxprof_blog/2011/02/size-matters-.html https://perma.cc/9D6S-EE5C]; Mystal, Latest Cooley Rankings, supra. Thomas Cooley—which achieved the lowest 2010 Reputation Score in
our sample using the methodology detailed in Section II.F—currently has one of the weakest
entering-class Profiles in the country among accredited law schools and an “ultimate” bar
passage rate (within two years of graduation) as reported to the ABA in 2017 among the ten
worst among accredited law schools, Staci Zaretsky, The Law Schools with the Worst ‘Ultimate’ Bar Pass Rates, ABOVE LAW (Apr. 10, 2018, 12:44 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/201
8/04/the-law-schools-with-the-worst-ultimate-bar-pass-rates/ [https://perma.cc/MJU5-XM25
]. Cooley’s self-ranking system was the subject of pointed criticism, see, e.g., Caron, supra;
Mystal, Latest Cooley Rankings, supra, and appears to have largely disappeared from the
school’s marketing.
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interests bearing on what makes for “quality” in a law school, and possibly different perspectives on the same priorities and interests, at any given time. So
you might forgive (or even praise) that more acute observer for asking, “Quality in what, and according to whose needs and preferences?”
All that said, however, the simple fact is that during the Comparison Period
at issue in our study there was continuous and widespread discourse among
prospective law students about different schools’ relative Reputations for general overall quality. And overwhelmingly, students reported that they relied on
perceived relative Reputation for quality in making choices about where they
applied and eventually matriculated.80
Our study explores the relationship between relative Reputational strength
and performance in the legal education market as measured by the three Performance Variables we have identified. We thus must define a measure of rela80

The U.S. News rankings offer themselves as a relative ranking of general overall lawschool quality. And 40 percent of the resulting ranking is directly based on a reputational
survey among legal academics and administrators (25 percent) and lawyers and judges (15
percent). See Morse & Hines, supra note 24. A survey of prospective LSAT takers by the
Kaplan test preparation organization in 2016 found that for 73 percent, U.S. News rankings
would “be an important factor in their decision[s] . . . where to apply and enroll.” See Kaplan
Test Prep Survey: Pre-Law Students Put Heavy Emphasis on U.S. News & World Report’s
Rankings, but Most Law School Admissions Officers Want Them Gone, KAPLAN TEST PREP
(Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.kaptest.com/blog/press/2016/03/15/kaplan-test-prep-survey-pr
e-law-students-put-heavy-emphasis-on-u-s-news-world-reports-rankings-but-most-lawschool-admissions-officers-want-them-gone/ [https://perma.cc/8M3H-QL6P]. The Before
the JD Study shows similar results, particularly among those students with LSATs of 165 or
higher, for whom “General reputation/school ranking” was the most significant factor in
their decision of where to apply to law school. See GALLUP & ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., supra note 25, at 54 fig.8.1. This high degree of influence in prospective law-student decisionmaking prevailed throughout the Comparison Period. See Kaplan Test Prep Survey: Aspiring
Law School Students Place Rankings Above All Else, BUSINESS WIRE (Nov. 16, 2010, 8:30
AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101116005536/en/Kaplan-Test-Prep-Surv
ey-Aspiring-Law-School [https://perma.cc/H4A5-M2PJ] (stating that 86 percent of prospective LSAT takers surveyed in 2010 considered a law school’s ranking “very” or “somewhat
important” in choosing a law school). There are multiple commercial websites at which interested persons share views about the relative merits of American law schools. See, e.g.,
TOP LAW SCHOOLS, http://www.top-law-schools.com [https://perma.cc/J4G8-D28A] (last
visited Feb. 20, 2019); LAW SCHOOL NUMBERS, http://www.lawschoolnumbers.com [https://p
erma.cc/3FBN-WGXL] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
Of course, the U.S. News rankings have long been widely and justifiably criticized for their
methodology and reliability, as well as the perverse incentives they create for ranked
schools. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, Measuring Outcomes: PostGraduation Measures of Success in the U.S. News & World Report Law School Rankings,
83 IND. L.J. 791, 812, 833 (2008); Nancy B. Rapoport, Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S.
News & World Report Shouldn’t Want to Be Compared to Time and Newsweek—or The
New Yorker, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1098–99 (1999); Brian Leiter, The U.S. News Law
School Rankings: A Guide for the Perplexed, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL RANKINGS (May
2003), http://www.leiterrankings.com/usnews/guide.shtml [https://perma.cc/6VXL-4UYQ].
We do not defend them. We note only that, wisely or not, prospective law-school applicants
have broadly relied on them to determine their application priorities and choices, and continue to do so.
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tive Reputational strength. The U.S. News rankings, though broadly relied on
(and, ironically, at the same time highly disparaged), do not furnish a relative
ranking for the Reputationally weakest accredited American law schools, including 37 of the 110 schools in our sample.81 To avoid this distortion, we rely
instead on the insight that, all other things being equal, schools compete for the
students with the strongest conventional qualifications, and thus create a Reputation metric based on schools’ 2010 entering-student Profile.82
For the sake of consistency, we measure Reputation in the same way as
Profile. We use 2010 entering-class Profile as our “base” year, as the 2010 Profiles reflect the ability to attract particular levels of applicant strength immediately prior to the multi-year reduction in applications and applicant quality that
is the focus of this study. Each school’s Reputation Score in 2010 (“R”) thus is
simply:83
R = 2010 Profile = (55% x Med P-LSAT) + (45% x Med N-UGPA) where
Med P-LSAT = median percentile entering-class LSAT in 2010
Med N-UGPA = median entering-class UGPA in 2010, normalized on
a 100-point scale

G. Methodology: Comparing Relative Reputational Strength with the Changes
in Each Performance Variable
Our goal is to compare law schools’ responses to the dramatic reduction in
the number and quality of law-school applicants between 2010 and 2016, and
to determine whether particular identifiable differences among law schools correspond with different responses. To do so, we determined for each law school
in our sample the percentage change in its Performance Variables over the

81

Paul Caron, 2019 U.S. News Law School Peer Reputation Rankings (And Overall Rankings), TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 20, 2018), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2018/03/20
19-us-news-law-school-peer-reputation-rankings-and-overall-rankings.html. In addition, the
U.S. News rankings, where available, are on a smooth scale of successive integers that may
not reflect compression or dilation at different ranges of the scale. See Derek Muller, Visualizing the 2018 U.S. News Law School Rankings—The Way They Should be Represented,
EXCESS DEMOCRACY (Mar. 14, 2017), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2017/3/visualizin
g-the-2018-us-news-law-school-rankings-the-way-they-should-be-presented [https://perma.c
c/FV9Y-DKFG]. And while reliance on the academic and professional reputation scores that
are factors in the U.S. News rankings, see supra note 74, do not present either of these difficulties, they are only a portion of the overall ranking, are suspect both in their methodology
and poor response rate, and are surveys of populations other than the one we care about
here—namely the prospective law students who are making decisions about whether and
where to purchase a legal education. That said, the U.S. News rankings where available are
very strongly correlated with the Profile-based measure we adopted. Thus use of a U.S.
News-based Reputation metric would apparently produce no material difference in the correlations discussed infra Part III.B.2.
82 See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
83 The highest 2010 Reputation Score (Yale) was 98.38; the lowest (Thomas Cooley) was
50.18 (spreadsheet with calculations on file with the authors).
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course of the Comparison Period—as defined above, ΔProfile, ΔSize, and ΔNet
Tuition.
We determined the degree of correlation between each school’s relative
Reputational strength and the change in each of its Performance Variables to
see whether Reputational strength can predict relative changes in a school’s
Performance Variables. We performed this analysis for the sample as a whole;
and for the sample divided into thirds according to Reputational strength as
measured by each school’s Reputational Score. The next Part details our findings.
III. FINDINGS: COMPETITIVE COPING STRATEGIES AND BEHAVIORS THE DATA
ILLUSTRATE
Our goal is to determine whether we can identify patterns in law schools’
competitive performance and behaviors in response to the dramatic reduction in
the number and credentials of law school applicants between academic years
2010–11 and 2016–17. In this Part, we identify some of our working hypotheses, and test them against the empirical data.
A. Our Working Hypotheses
Because the market for legal education is competitive, a sudden fall in demand imposes competitive pressures on and forces reactions from sellers (that
is, law schools). Because schools compete for students (buyers) with respect to
quality (or perceived quality), relative market strength in this market ought to
be measurable by relative Reputational strength. Considering these forces in the
context of the Performance Variables we identified describing market performance (ΔProfile, ΔSize, and ΔNet Tuition)—which we stress represent the
change in these variables for each school across the six-year Comparison Period in which the market adjusted to the 2010 market shock—we would expect to
see that, the lower a school’s Reputational strength, the more that school will
find itself forced to give up across all Performance Variables.
At the same time, we predicted that the Performance Variables would not
move in perfect concert. Any given school can to some degree trade these variables off against one another: As discussed above, a school might choose any
of the following, singly or in combination:
• to give up class Size in order to preserve Profile, taking a smaller class of
more highly credentialed students (because more of such students
would have been admitted to, and have matriculated at, Reputationally
Stronger schools trying to fill their own shortfall from the reduced
number of applicants); or
• to give up Profile in order to preserve class Size, taking a larger class of
less-well-credentialed students; or
• to make concessions on Net Tuition by discounting tuition to “buy” higher-Profile matriculants, thus attempting to maintain Size and Profile.
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The rate of tradeoff among these variables, we hypothesized, would be determined by the particular tactical choices and practical circumstances of each
law school, including not only its competitive (Reputational) and geographic
position, but its access to sources of revenue other than tuition, which could
make Net Tuition easier or harder to compromise.84
Nevertheless, we expected a statistically significant correlation between
Reputation and each individual Performance Variable. That is, we expected that
the weaker a school’s Reputation, the more concessions that school would have
to make on the overall combination of Performance Variables. And though a
particular school might choose for any number of reasons to make more concessions on one variable than another, we expected that overall each variable
would tend to show a greater negative change in rough proportion to the decrease in Reputation, resulting in correlations between Reputation and each
Performance Variable across the entire sample.
As foreshadowed earlier, the data generally bear out these hypotheses, but
with some (at least to us) surprising and enlightening exceptions.
B. Change in Individual Performance Variables Over the Comparison Period,
and the Relationship Between that Change and a Law School’s
Reputational Strength
In this Section, we examine correlations between law schools’ Reputation
Scores and the changes in their Performance Variables and in ΔRevenue—that
is, how much each variable moved in concert with Reputation over the Comparison Period. We test the correlation with Reputation Score for each Performance Variable and ΔRevenue over the full sample of 110 private schools, as
well as in three subgroups of our sample: the top, middle, and bottom third
Reputationally. We show all our results here in Table 3.1, and then reproduce
relevant lines of the table in the sections discussing those findings.

84

Such alternative sources of revenue could include central university support, “Rainy Day”
funds, endowment, fundraising, and tuition from non-JD programs. At the public institutions
we were not able to include in our sample, see supra Section II.C, it also includes subsidies
from the state the institution is located in and serves.
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TABLE 3.1: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REPUTATION AND PERFORMANCE VARIABLES85

ΔSize
ΔProfile
ΔNet Tuition
ΔRevenue

Full Sample
(110 Schools)
71%
(0.00)
49%
(0.00)
6%
(0.51)
49%
(0.00)

Reputationally
Stronger Third
70%
(0.00)
62%
(0.00)
66%
(0.00)
75%
(0.00)

Reputationally
Middle Third
13%
(0.43)
-15%
(0.40)
32%
(0.06)
21%
(0.23)

Reputationally
Weaker Third
41%
(0.00)
-4%
(0.87)
-33%
(0.04)
-2%
(0.91)

1. Relationship Between Reputational Strength and Change in EnteringClass Size over the Comparison Period (ΔSize)
TABLE 3.2: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REPUTATION AND CHANGE IN ENTERING-CLASS
SIZE (ΔSIZE)

ΔSize

Full Sample
(110 Schools)
71%
(0.00)

Reputationally
Stronger Third
70%
(0.00)

Reputationally
Middle Third
13%
(0.43)

Reputationally
Weaker Third
41%
(0.00)

We find that the strongest and most consistent correlations exist between
change in Reputational strength and entering-class Size over the Comparison
Period, but with much weaker and non-statistically-significant correlation for
Reputationally Middle law schools.
Across all law schools in our sample, changes (almost universally reductions) in a law school’s entering-class Size over the course of the Comparison
Period are correlated with the school’s Reputational strength (ρ = 71 percent).
As we saw in Part I, the average law school reduced entering-class Size by
nearly a third (31 percent) during the Comparison Period; in fact, only four
schools in our 110-school sample actually increased in Size, while only two
more remained the same. This statistical result accords with common sense:
The weaker a law school’s Reputation, the more difficulty it would have attracting students with the Profile that the school would prefer because of com85

The findings in the Table are calculated from the data gathered in Appendix I. The data in
Appendix I are gathered or derived as described in Part II, and ultimately come from the information gathered from accredited law schools and reported by the ABA. Correlation is a
way of measuring the tendency of two sets of data to move generally in the same direction
and proportions. The top value in each cell, represented as a percentage, is the correlation
coefficient (ρ) for the schools in that portion of the sample between percentage change in
that Variable over the Comparison Period and Reputation Score. The number beneath it in
parentheses is the p value for that correlation, which represents the probability that the correlation could have occurred merely by chance. A p value reported as “0.00” means that the p
value for that correlation is less than .01. p values less than 0.05 are generally viewed as statistically significant. Statistically significant correlations in Tables 3.1–3.5 are in italics.
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petition with Reputationally Stronger schools, and the less such a school would
be able to maintain entering-class Size during a time when applications per
school fell on average over 40 percent.86
However, the correlation strength varies within different portions of the
sample. As shown in Table 3.2, the correlation between Reputation and change
in entering-class Size is strong across the whole sample as well as within the
Reputationally Stronger and Weaker thirds of the sample, with the correlation
being weaker in the Reputationally Weaker third but still statistically significant. These variances can be explained by the practical circumstances in which
the legal academy found itself during the Comparison Period.
Reputationally Stronger schools consistently preferred to give up Size and
Net Tuition rather than compromise Profile.87 This finding aligns with the insight that Profile is generally seen in the market as a proxy for Reputational
prestige.
Among Reputationally Middle schools, change in entering-class Size has a
lower correlation with Reputation that is not statistically significant (that is, not
reliably different from no correlation at all). This difference is likely explained
by the fact that, for law schools in the middle of the sample, increasing competition for students and varying circumstances resulted in more variability
among schools as to which Performance Variables (ΔSize, ΔProfile, and/or
ΔNet Tuition) to sacrifice, and in what relative measure. Because the tradeoffs
vary at each school, no one Performance Variable is well correlated with Reputation in this portion of the sample; some schools will choose to “spend” their
Reputational strength predominantly on one Variable, while other schools will
focus on others. We refer to this phenomenon as “Tradeoff Variability,” and we
see it in all of the Performance Variables in the Reputationally Middle portion
of the sample.88
Reputationally Weaker schools bump up against a Regulatory Constraint:
ABA Standard 501 requires a school to admit only “applicants who appear capable of satisfactorily completing its program of legal education and being admitted to the bar.”89 The competitively weakest schools, for which Reputational
86

See infra Appendix I. The four schools that increased entering class Size are consistent
with our hypotheses. They are Yale, Vanderbilt, University of Southern California, and
Notre Dame, whose entering-class Sizes increased between 2 and 9 percent. Stanford and
Harvard were unchanged (spreadsheets with compiled data on file with the authors).
87 See supra Section I.B; infra Section III.B.4.
88 See supra Sections III.B.2–III.B.4.
89 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 31. Standard 501(b) thus sets a generalized standard
for anticipated student performance rather than a bright-line rule with specific numeric Profile requirements. This imprecision, which may have other advantages (such as admitting for
the possibility that some schools can achieve greater success with weaker students than others), leaves room for schools to guess (whether honestly or opportunistically) about the relationship between future performance and Profile levels that are lower than the school may be
accustomed to. While this may allow what amounts to gambling with weaker students’ tuition dollars, it also allows some room for schools to learn how to manage and accommodate
demographic change in their student bodies. Nevertheless, there appears to be some degree
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prestige is largely out of reach, appear to have compromised Profile as far as
they could to raise Revenue, but simply couldn’t find enough students who
meet the constraint of Standard 501 to fill their classrooms.90 Accordingly, Size
shrank the most in this portion of the sample as Reputation fell, but not as consistently relative to Reputation as among the Reputationally Stronger schools.
Figure 3.1 is a scatterplot of Reputational Score against change in enteringclass Size (the data summarized above in Table 3.2). It shows that while most
of the Reputationally Stronger schools saw class Sizes fall by 25 percent or
less, the Reputationally Middle and Reputationally Weaker schools had a
broader distribution of Size changes (represented by a wider scatter on the left
side of the graph).
FIGURE 3.1: CORRELATION BETWEEN 2010 REPUTATION VS CHANGE IN ENTERING CLASS
Correlation between S2010
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of consensus that, at any given school, there is a bottom limit somewhere for LSAT and
UGPA beneath which it does not generally appear students are capable of making it. See,
e.g., David Frakt, The ABA and the LSAT: How Low is Too Low?, FACULTY LOUNGE (Nov.
18, 2017), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2017/11/how-low-is-too-low.html [https://perma
.cc/G77D-GMMR].
90 Some of the Reputationally Weaker schools apparently went too far in this regard. Record-low entering class Profile, rising attrition rates and falling bar-passage rates have
prompted the ABA to impose sanctions on several law schools ranging from notices of noncompliance to complete withdrawal of accreditation. See Accreditation Archives, ABA
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/accreditation/accreditation_archives/ [
https://perma.cc/AW6Y-JQ3V] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019); Kristen Rasmussen, 10 Law
Schools Sanctioned by ABA for Lax Admissions, LAW.COM (Nov. 21, 2017, 4:21 PM), https:/
/www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/11/21/10-law-schools-sanctioned-by-aba-for-lax-admissi
ons-outcomes/ [https://perma.cc/T4RN-QSZF].
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2. Relationship Between Reputational Strength and Change in EnteringClass LSAT and UGPA over the Comparison Period (ΔProfile)
TABLE 3.3: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REPUTATION AND CHANGE IN ENTERING-CLASS
PROFILE (ΔPROFILE)

ΔProfile

Full Sample
(110 Schools)
49%
(0.00)

Reputationally
Stronger Third
62%
(0.00)

Reputationally
Middle Third
-15%
(0.40)

Reputationally
Weaker Third
-4%
(0.87)

We find that change in entering-class Profile over the Comparison Period
is correlated with relative school Reputation, but predominantly among the
Reputationally Stronger schools.
Across all law schools in our sample, changes in entering-class Profile over
the course of the Comparison Period (again almost universally reductions) are
correlated with the school’s Reputational strength (ρ = 49 percent). But the correlation is concentrated among Reputationally Stronger schools, which when
considered separately show a statistically significant correlation (ρ = 62 percent). This statistical finding makes practical sense in that the Reputationally
Stronger schools have continued their historical focus on attracting the highestProfile students, and have proved willing to sacrifice Size and Net Tuition to do
so.91
Considered as separate populations, the Reputationally Middle and Reputationally Weaker schools show no meaningful correlation between Reputation
and Profile. For the Reputationally Middle third, Tradeoff Variability is again
the likely explanation—Reputationally Middle schools chose a wider range of
different tradeoffs among Size, Profile, and Net Tuition, resulting in no statistically-significant correlation between ΔProfile and Reputation within this group.
Among the Reputationally Weaker schools, there also may be much less consistent attention to Profile, given that rankings gains for these schools often are
not a high priority. Regulatory Constraints, namely Standard 501, probably also
explain the lack of correlation among Reputationally Weaker schools: some
Reputationally Weaker schools were already close to bottom Profile limits imposed as a practical matter by Standard 501, and thus could not reduce their

91

See supra Section III.B.1. Only three schools in our sample were able to maintain or increase their entering-class Profile between 2010 and 2016. Those schools are Stanford, Liberty, and Detroit Mercy; Harvard and Yale maintained Profile at 2010 levels. Stanford, Harvard, and Yale are consistent with our hypothesis, in that their leading Reputations accorded
them the market power to maintain Profile. The other two schools lie among the Reputationally Weaker portion of our sample, but have distinctive situations that likely explain their
unusual, and unusually successful, emphasis on improving Profile. See infra Section III.B.3
(discussing pricing advantages some Reputationally Weaker schools appear to have exploited).
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Profile much further, or as much as they might have been willing to absent the
constraint.92
Figure 3.2 is a scatterplot of Reputational Score against change in enteringclass Profile (the data summarized above in Table 3.3), with a best-fit curve.
The widening scatter of ΔProfile as Reputation falls (toward the left of the
graph) is even more visible in this distribution than in Figure 3.1 (charting
ΔSize), and is probably explained by the factors just discussed.93
FIGURE 3.2: CORRELATION BETWEEN 2010 REPUTATION VS CHANGE IN PROFILE FROM
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3. Relationship Between Reputational Strength and Change in Average
Actual Tuition Per Student over the Comparison Period (ΔNet Tuition)
TABLE 3.4: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REPUTATION AND CHANGE IN AVERAGE ACTUAL
TUITION PER STUDENT (ΔNET TUITION)

ΔNet Tuition
92

Full Sample
(110 Schools)
6%
(0.51)

Reputationally
Strongest Third
66%
(0.00)

Reputationally
Middle Third
32%
(0.06)

Reputationally
Weakest Third
-33%
(0.04)

See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. Some of these Reputationally Weaker
schools also appear to have surrendered a great deal of Size in an effort to maintain Profile
compliant with the minimum requirements of Standard 501(b). Thomas Cooley and Appalachian shrank over the Comparison Period by more than 70 percent, and Florida Coastal by
more than 60 percent. All three still ended up subjected to ABA sanctions of one kind or another. See Frakt, supra note 89.
93 The two significant outliers in the upper left quadrant, with unexpectedly strong Profile
improvements, are Liberty and Detroit Mercy, both of which are discussed supra note 91.
But even if we take out these two schools, the correlation between Reputation and ΔProfile
is far lower, and the scatter much greater, on the Reputationally Weaker (left) side of the distribution.

19 NEV. L.J. 583, BURK ET AL.

Winter 2018]

4/25/2019 8:25 PM

COMPETITIVE COPING STRATEGIES

623

We find that change in average Net Tuition per student over the Comparison Period is not correlated with relative school Reputation generally (ρ = 6
percent), but is well correlated among the Reputationally Stronger law schools
and, surprisingly, negatively correlated among the Reputationally Weaker
schools (ρ = -33 percent).
This result seems counterintuitive: We would have expected that, like
ΔSize and ΔProfile, as the number of applications fell, and competitive pressures increased, the Reputationally Stronger schools would have been most
able to maintain Net Tuition, and the Reputationally Weaker schools least able
to do so. This result would have been consistent with the fact that, generally,
consumers will insist on paying lower prices for substitutes perceived to be of
lower quality. And in fact, that correlation appears strongly among the Reputationally Stronger schools (ρ = 66 percent). But considered as separate populations, the Reputationally Middle schools show a weaker (and non-statistically
significant) correlation, and the Reputationally Weaker schools show a negative
correlation to a statistically significant degree. In other words, some of the
weakest schools Reputationally were able to discount tuition less over the
course of the Comparison Period than many of their stronger competitors.
These initially puzzling results become easier to appreciate when viewed as
a scatterplot of Reputational Score against change in average Net Tuition per
student (again, the data summarized above in Table 3.4):
FIGURE 3.3: CORRELATION BETWEEN 2010 REPUTATION AND CHANGE IN NET TUITION
Correlation between 2010 Reputation
and Change in Net Tuition from
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Reputation

The quadratic (smile) shape of the best-fit curve suggests some practical
explanations: the Reputationally Stronger schools were able to maintain or increase average Net Tuition per student. Many law schools in this group do negotiate Net Tuition (scholarships); the stronger the school’s Reputation, however, the better its bargaining position and ability to maintain Net Tuition
without losing candidates. Reputationally Middle schools, consistent with our
theory of Tradeoff Variability, found themselves making a range of different
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choices among Size, Profile, and Net Tuition depending on their circumstances,
resulting in no statistically significant correlation between Reputation and Net
Tuition among this cohort. While the degree of discounting varied, however,
these Reputationally Middle schools generally suffered in the competition for
students in a declining market, seeing the largest average percentage decline in
Net Tuition of the three subgroups (-16 percent, as compared with -6 percent
for the Reputationally Weaker third).94
As for why some of the Reputationally Weaker schools would, apparently
perversely, be able to maintain or even raise their average Net Tuition in the
face of a competitive shock, we offer the Limited Options Effect. It has two
components: first, circumstances particular to some Reputationally Weaker
schools may blunt pricing pressures on those schools. Many of the weakest applicants admitted to Reputationally Weaker law schools likely have been admitted only to Reputationally Weaker schools and, we would guess, not infrequently to only one.95 These schools are much less focused on pursuing Profile
to enhance their rankings and Reputation, so they have little incentive to offer
scholarships to attract stronger students. And they would be particularly disinclined to negotiate on Net Tuition with weaker applicants because those students have only very limited options available to them if they wish to try to become lawyers.96
Second, there is a social status dynamic that also may be at work. For students from lower socioeconomic strata (who because of reduced access to educational and social opportunities during their formative years are disproportionately represented among weaker students at Reputationally Weaker schools),97
entry into a learned profession is still viewed as a traditional path of upward
mobility and an attractive social status enhancement. These values may sup94

See supra Table 1.1.
LSAC has data indicating that those applying to one or only a few law schools tend to
have a lower mean LSAT, suggesting that students on the low end of the LSAT distribution
may truly have limited options, either self-imposed (by applying only to one or two or three
law schools) or by circumstance (getting admitted to only one law school). See RICHARD
STROUS-ROONEY & KIMBERLY DUSTMAN, NATIONAL APPLICANT TRENDS—2017, at 4
(LSAC), https://www.lsac.org/system/files/inline-files/National%20Applicant%20Trends_20
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/68AH-HKGV].
96 The economically-minded reader might suggest that, in a market with multiple Reputationally Weaker schools admitting students unlikely to be admitted elsewhere, there still
should have been price competition (that is, competitive discounting of tuition) among those
schools willing to admit the weakest students. But weaker students apparently tend to limit
their applications or matriculation geographically—they tend to apply only to schools near
home, or at least hold a strong geographic preference to attend a school that doesn’t require
them to move, which of course offers significant financial savings relative to a comparablequality but geographically distant school. See supra notes 66, 95.
97 See Chad Christensen, LSSSE Project Manager, and Jerry Organ, Professor of Law and
Co-Director of the Holloran Center for Ethical Leadership in the Professions, University of
St. Thomas School of Law, Scholarships and Access to the Legal Profession for Minorities
and Low-Income Students at AccessLex Institute Research Symposium (Nov. 9, 2017)
(presentation on file with author).
95
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plement economic concerns in a student’s career-choice calculus so that even
when the risk-discounted return on investment in a law degree is questionable
(given the lower bar passage rates and worse employment outcomes at some of
these Reputationally Weaker law schools, especially for their weaker students),
the student may feel more inclined to take the risk.98 With almost unlimited
amounts of student loan money available, the student succumbs to optimism
bias and hyperbolic discounting (the tendency to underweight the significance
of payments that do not have to be made until several years in the future), and
accepts the undiscounted tuition demand of the Limited Option school rather
than forgo law school altogether.
4. Relationship Between Reputational Strength and Change in Total
Tuition Revenue Per Year over the Comparison Period (ΔRevenue)
TABLE 3.5: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REPUTATION AND CHANGE IN TOTAL TUITION
REVENUE PER YEAR

ΔRevenue

Full Sample
(110 Schools)
49%
(0.00)

Reputationally
Strongest Third
75%
(0.00)

Reputationally
Middle Third
21%
(0.23)

Reputationally
Weakest Third
-2%
(0.91)

We find that change in Tuition Revenue per school over the Comparison
Period is correlated with relative school Reputation generally (ρ = 49 percent).
Considering the sample in separate Reputational subgroups, Reputation and
ΔRevenue are strongly correlated among the Reputationally Stronger law
schools, but not statistically significantly correlated in either of the bottom two
subgroups.99
Figure 3.4 on the next page provides a scatterplot of Reputational Score
against change in total Tuition Revenue.

98

See Milan Markovic & Gabriele Plickert, The Paradox of Minority Attorney Satisfaction
16–21 (Jan. 31, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=3205344 [https://perma.cc/SM3M-7HQP] (suggesting that minority attorneys may
find status and satisfaction that compensates for some economic concerns in service to and
corresponding recognition among their communities); Jerry Organ, Understanding Trends in
Demographics of Law Students—Part Three, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Nov. 24, 2013), http://la
wprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/11/understanding-trends-in-demographics-o
f-law-students-part-three.html [https://perma.cc/9GRR-QLA9].
99 To reiterate our category definitions, Revenue is not strictly an arithmetic function of Net
Tuition and Size. Size counts the entering class only, while Revenue is calculated on the basis of Net Tuition paid by all JD students enrolled in the entire JD program in any given academic year. Revenue, thus, takes into account student transfers and changes in scholarships
after the first year. See supra note 65.
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FIGURE 3.4:
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The relationship between Reputation and change in Tuition Revenue over
the Comparison Period appears to be explained by the same phenomena we
suggest have influenced the Performance Variables. The Reputationally
Stronger schools have the easiest time holding overall student census and Net
Tuition at customary levels. As this power sinks across this population, Revenue changes to a greater degree. For Reputationally Middle law schools,
Tradeoff Variability leaves no one Performance Variable consistently correlated with Reputation.100
For Reputationally Weaker law schools, the Limited Options Effect allows
some of the Reputationally Weaker schools to maintain or raise their average
Net Tuition per student.101 But at the same time, these law schools feel the effects of Regulatory Constraints—they tend to have a harder time maintaining
Size because there are not enough Standard-501-compliant students available to
do so.102 Thus for Reputationally Weaker law schools, the two factors that
combine to produce total Tuition Revenue (Net Tuition per student and total
number of students) don’t always move in tandem, with the result that Net Tuition may hold or go up,103 but Revenue may go up less, or fall. Over the whole
sample, then, Revenue and Reputation are correlated, but as the best-fit curve
in Figure 3.4 illustrates, because of pricing advantages conferred by the Limited Options Effect, some Reputationally Weaker institutions also had an easier
time maintaining Tuition Revenue than many better-regarded schools.

100
101
102
103

See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
See supra Figure 3.3.
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The correlations between Reputation and Revenue also show another important pattern: Reputationally Stronger schools tend to hold on to Profile at the
expense of Size and/or Net Tuition. We can infer this tendency from the fact
that the Reputationally Stronger law schools have the most power to preserve
Revenue; Revenue is statistically significantly correlated with Reputation
across the entire sample, and strongly correlated among the Reputationally
Stronger law schools.104 Strong correlations between Reputation and both Size
and Net Tuition (both significant components of Revenue) also prevail among
the Reputationally Stronger schools.105 Yet the average Reputationally Stronger
law school gave up substantial Revenue over the Comparison Period—on average about $5.9 million annually per school.106 Given the choice between Profile
and either Size or Net Tuition (which together make up most of what determines Revenue), these schools chose Profile.
Put a little differently, the Reputationally Stronger schools gave up some
entering-class Size that they didn’t have to—more applicants would have accepted their offers of enrollment had these Stronger schools been willing to dip
deeper into the applicant pool and accept some students with lower-thanaccustomed Profile. But the Reputationally Stronger schools chose to lower
their Profile standards only modestly (or not at all), and accepted reductions in
Size (and to some degree Net Tuition) in an effort to preserve Profile as much
as possible relative to peer institutions. This decision effectively left more applicants (with somewhat weaker Profiles) available to Reputationally Middle
and Weaker schools.
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The findings just discussed have important implications for the current
state, and probable future, of the American legal academy. We discuss those
implications here.
A. Reputationally Stronger Schools’ Drive to Preserve Profile at the Expense
of Size Likely Prevented as Many as Twenty Weaker Schools from Being
Forced to Close
As just discussed, the Reputationally Stronger law schools sought to preserve Profile at the expense of Size and Net Tuition, taking smaller classes of
students in an effort to minimize erosion of LSATs and UGPAs rather than
welcoming larger classes of weaker students.107 The reason is not hard to infer:
Profile is a 22.5 percent factor in a school’s U.S. News ranking, which is a
measure of Reputation for relative general quality widely relied on by prospec104
105
106
107

See supra Table 3.5.
See supra Table 3.1; see also Taylor, supra note 58, at 333–36.
See supra Table 1.1.
See supra Section III.B.1, Table 1.1, Figure 3.1.
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tive law students in choosing a school.108 In contrast, neither entering-class Size
nor Net Tuition (per se) has a direct effect on rankings.109 And even though
Reputationally Stronger schools gave up Size over Profile, their relative Reputational Strength still allowed them to decrease in Size much less than Reputationally Middle or Reputationally Weaker law schools. As a result, the top third
of our sample Reputationally shrank its entering-class Size on average by 13
percent during the Comparison Period, while the bottom third shrank its entering-class Size on average by 46 percent.110
These choices on the part of Reputationally Stronger law schools have important implications for the Reputationally Middle and Reputationally Weaker
law schools. Suppose that the law schools in the top half of our sample had
chosen to keep entering-class Sizes the same, and had made the necessary sacrifices in Profile and Price to do so.111 This would have pulled roughly 3,300
prospective students who ended up enrolling at bottom-half schools into
schools in the top half, resulting in an average of 102 students per entering
class in bottom-half schools in our sample as opposed to the 164 students per
class that those schools actually matriculated. That shortfall of over 3,300 entering students for the bottom-half schools in our sample of 110 law schools
amounts to the entire average entering class of at least 20 such law schools!112
While it’s impossible to know how many weaker schools would have downsized further and tried to soldier on, and how many would have been forced to
close outright, we can safely say that stronger law schools’ focus on preserving
entering-class Profile prevented widespread devastation among Reputationally
Middle and Weaker schools, and almost certainly forestalled numerous failures.
B. Many Law Schools Gave Up Millions of Dollars in Tuition to Preserve
Their General Reputation for Quality Rather than Improve Their Programs
As shown above, the average law school shrank its entering-class Size by
nearly a third (31 percent), while the actual average Net Tuition paid per student across our sample generally fell modestly in real terms.113 At the same
time, as just discussed, Reputationally Stronger schools tended to preserve Profile at the expense of Size as a means of preserving Reputation. Enrolling fewer
students at a lower Net Tuition has an easily predictable effect on Tuition Revenue—at most schools in our sample, it fell. On average, 2016 Tuition Revenue

108

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Size is a factor in overall JD student census, and expenditures per student and studentfaculty ratios are factors in a school’s U.S. News ranking. See Morse & Hines, supra note 24.
So Size does have some indirect effect on U.S. News rankings, all other things being equal.
110 See supra Table 1.1.
111 The authors thank Brett Scharffs of Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law
School for sharing this perspective with Professor Organ in September 2014.
112 Calculations on file with the authors.
113 See supra note 99 and accompanying text, Table. 1.1.
109
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was about $5.9 million lower than in 2010 for Reputationally Stronger
schools.114
As a practical matter, this implies that many Reputationally Stronger law
schools chose to sacrifice millions of dollars in Tuition Revenue per year in order to preserve Profile as a means of maintaining their Reputation for relative
quality. Theoretically these millions could have been collected by restructuring
first-year admissions criteria to maintain more Size with some sacrifice in Profile. That additional Tuition Revenue could then have been spent on faculty,
facilities, curricular innovations, and labor-intensive teaching and student support, including clinical and skills instruction, and academic success and career
services support. Or it could have been used to reduce the cost of a legal education (and resulting debt load) for those lacking personal or family resources.
It is worth asking whether the investment choice that most law schools
made in this regard was a wise one. We suggest no answer to the question here,
and concede the possibility that these sacrifices might have been necessary to
preserve the quality these law schools already enjoyed in the prevailing competitive environment. But as a practical matter, the best-regarded law schools in
the country decided to buy students with higher LSATs and UGPAs rather than
expand their faculties, facilities, or access to clinical and experiential education.
And the issue has not even been widely discussed.
C. The Cost of Legal Education Has Been Imposed More and More
Disproportionately on Those Least Likely to Be Able to Bear It
As shown above, over the course of the Comparison Period actual average
Net Tuition per student fell modestly, while Base or “sticker price” Tuition increased on average 15 percent. Because some students do pay full freight, the
range of prices students paid for a legal education has increased significantly
over that time. And because almost all scholarship aid at almost all law schools
is “merit-” (that is, predominantly Profile-) based, overwhelmingly the weakest
students receive the least aid, and pay the highest Net Tuition.115 Worse, the
weakest students, especially at Reputationally Weaker schools, are most at risk
of not obtaining a law-related job, or of obtaining a law job that pays less than
other law graduates’.116
Several conclusions are inevitable: Those students who pay the most for a
legal education generally are least likely to be able to make any direct use of
the education they have paid for. And even if they do find a law job, they are
114

See supra note 99 and accompanying text, Table. 1.1.
See Organ, Net Tuition, supra note 25, at 74; Karen Sloan, Minority Law Students Subsidize Scholarships, Study Finds, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 9, 2017, 2:09 PM), https://www.law.com/na
tionallawjournal/almID/1202778852592/minority-law-students-subsidize-scholarships-study
-finds/ [https://perma.cc/Y3DN-KVR3]; see also Aaron N. Taylor, Making State Merit
Scholarship Programs More Equitable and Less Vulnerable, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 155, 167–
70 (2015) (discussing the phenomenon in higher education generally).
116 See Organ, Net Tuition, supra note 25, at 66–70.
115

19 NEV. L.J. 583, BURK ET AL.

630

4/25/2019 8:25 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:2

least likely to find a job that economically justifies and supports the amounts
they paid. Moreover, both of these inequalities have increased significantly
over the Comparison Period.117
D. The Discrepancy Between Student Needs and Law-School Resources Has
Widened
As discussed above, Tuition Revenue fell substantially at most law schools
during the Comparison Period because of tuition discounting and class-size reductions. Beyond the Reputationally Stronger law schools, Tuition Revenue
fell over 40 percent on average, costing most schools $11 million to $12 million per year.118 At the same time, Profile fell noticeably at most law schools,
and substantially at many. Again, beyond the Reputationally Stronger schools,
median LSAT scores dropped 14–15 percentiles.119 Profile attempts to, and to
some degree does, measure readiness for law school (at least as currently configured) by reflecting some combination of academic talent, skills, preparation,
and acculturation of entering students.
In short, the demographics of many schools are changing, and there are unprecedented numbers of students who would appear to need different or better
teaching and curriculum, and in many cases extra-academic support, to succeed. Yet at the same time, schools have unprecedentedly depleted levels of resources available to meet these needs. Redoubling the irony inherent in current
tuition-discounting strategies, it is the weakest students who are not only generally paying the most for law degrees from which they will realize questionable
value, but whose disproportionate financial contributions are often being allocated to educational resources other than the ones that they are more likely to
need to succeed.120 We are likely seeing the effects of this widening gap in the
deteriorating bar exam results being reported across the country from 2014
through 2016 and, after brief improvement, in 2018.121

117

Id. at 65–71. And because most of these students have, to cover these costs, incurred
large student loans that are not dischargeable in bankruptcy other than in very rare and extreme circumstances, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012), many are effectively financially ruined for life.
118 See supra Table 1.1.
119 See supra Table 1.1.
120 See supra Section IV.C.
121 See David Frakt, Recent Bar Pass Rates—A Cautionary Tale, FACULTY LOUNGE (Nov. 5,
2018, 7:07 PM), https://www.thefacultylounge.org/2018/11/recent-bar-pass-rates-a-cautionar
y-tale.html [https://perma.cc/T8RW-TVGU]; Derek T. Muller, February 2018 MBE Bar
Scores Collapse to All-Time Record Low in Test History, EXCESS DEMOCRACY (Apr. 19,
2018), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2018/4/february-2018-mbe-bar-scores-collapse-t
o-all-time-record-low-in-test-history [https://perma.cc/F4E3-Y8J9]; Karen Sloan, Multistate
Bar Exam Scores Sink to 34-Year Low, Pass Rates Sag, LAW.COM (Sept. 17, 2018, 2:50 PM),
https://www.law.com/2018/09/17/multistate-bar-exam-scores-sink-to-34-year-low-pass-rates
-sag/ [https://perma.cc/D2ZF-9XZJ].
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CONCLUSION
The substantial contraction in the job market for new law graduates that
began after 2007 has worked a sea-change on the number and qualifications of
those considering law school. These changes have in turn transformed the demographics and economics of most American law schools. Driven by its particular combination of financial, practical, and market strengths and weaknesses, each law school has responded to this sudden and drastic reduction in
demand with a package of fiscal and demographic adjustments that can be
quantified in three Performance Variables: entering-class qualifications (“Profile”), entering-class Size, and pricing variation in the form of selective tuitiondiscounting by scholarship (“Net Tuition”).
While a handful of super-elite institutions have remained largely unaffected, for the vast majority of law schools the effects have been somewhere between significant and devastating. Numerous law schools have tried to reduce
costs by attrition, buyouts, or outright layoffs of faculty or staff.122 A number of
law schools have failed;123 several more are struggling;124 large numbers of

122

See, e.g., Paul Caron, Law Schools Have Shed 986 Full-Time Faculty (11%) Since 2010,
TAXPROF BLOG (Dec. 19, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/12/law-scho
ols-have-shed-.html [https://perma.cc/YSH7-HX3R]; Elizabeth Crisp, LSU Law Center Offers Buyouts to 7 Professors as Interest in Law Schools Dwindles Nationally, ADVOCATE
(Jan. 22, 2015, 7:06 AM), http://theadvocate.com/news/11137666-123/law-center-plans-buy
outs [https://perma.cc/M6ZC-ZQ97]; Katy Savage, Vermont Law School Restructuring Faculty, VTDIGGER (June 25, 2018), https://vtdigger.org/2018/06/25/vermont-law-school-restruc
turing-faculty/ [https://perma.cc/5Q67-HDUG]; Staci Zaretsky, Law School Offers Buyouts
to Tenured Faculty Thanks to Sharp Decline in Enrollment, ABOVE LAW (Feb. 29, 2016,
1:01 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/02/law-school-offers-buyouts-to-tenured-faculty-tha
nks-to-sharp-decline-in-enrollment/ [https://perma.cc/XSP5-LGYD]; Staci Zaretsky, LargeScale Layoffs Come to Cooley Law School, ABOVE LAW (Aug. 15, 2014, 10:07 AM), http://a
bovethelaw.com/2014/08/large-scale-layoffs-come-to-cooley-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/
EB6P-PZF9]. These adjustments have by no means been limited to Reputationally Middle or
Reputationally Weaker law schools. Northwestern, 2017 US News rank eleven, and holder of
the sixth-highest 2010 Reputation Score in our sample, recently announced faculty and staff
cutbacks. Karen Sloan, Northwestern Law Dean Cites School’s ‘Difficult Time’ as Reason
for Faculty Cuts, LAW.COM (Nov. 5, 2018, 5:10 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/11/05/nort
hwestern-law-dean-cites-schools-difficult-time-as-reason-for-faculty-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/
RXP3-4EHK]. As the preceding discussion shows, however, the greater a law school’s Reputational strength, generally the less it is likely to have been affected by the demand shock.
Reputationally Stronger schools likewise tend to have an easier time raising money among
alumni and other interested constituencies to help make up tuition shortfalls. See Karen
Sloan, Northwestern Law is Paring Back Amid Budget Woes. Are Other Elite Schools Next?,
LAW.COM (Nov. 8, 2018, 2:44 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/11/08/northwestern-law-is-p
aring-back-amid-budget-woes-are-other-elite-schools-next/ [https://perma.cc/95JK-BQXY].
123 See, e.g., Karen Sloan, Valparaiso Is Latest to Join the Crowd of Defunct Law Schools,
LAW.COM (Oct. 31, 2018, 1:21 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/10/31/valparaiso-is-latestto-join-the-crowd-of-defunct-law-schools/ [https://perma.cc/3PZE-DD4D]; Karen Sloan,
Whittier Law School’s Collapse Won’t Be the Last: Experts, LAW.COM (Apr. 20, 2017, 3:36
PM), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/04/20/whittier-law-schools-collapse-wont-be-t
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others no longer appear to be self-sustaining;125 and even many highly-regarded
institutions find themselves fighting to maintain their customary levels of student and educational quality.
Some administrators and faculty have faced these challenges with courage
and creativity, and there are innovations scattered about the academy that deserve note and emulation.126 But far more appear to be either in denial or so absorbed in staving off the impact of changing circumstances year to year that
they have not even tried to develop tactics or strategy for a sustainable longer
term. Faculty at many institutions are compounding the problem by abusing the
beneficial traditions of tenure and shared governance to blindly resist any
change that would require them to share any part of the burden.
We need to be blunt: change is hard, and never costless. But there is no
more time to pretend that this demographic and economic transformation is just
some transient episode that can simply be waited out.127 Most law schools that
are losing money, or seeing their graduation, bar-passage, or employment rates
fall to embarrassing levels, are encountering growing impatience from key constituencies including federal and state policymakers, regulators, university administrators, prospective and current students, and alumni. The choice for most
law schools is rapidly simplifying to one between developing organically in
ways devised and driven from within, and suffering what will likely be painful
and ill-tailored modifications imposed from outside.
Our purpose in this Article has been to describe and quantify the differences between the environment and conditions of legal education today compared with several short years ago. Understanding the nature and extent of the
challenges the academy faces would seem to be a necessary first step in adhe-last-experts/ [https://perma.cc/7RN7-ZL6D]; Staci Zaretsky, Charlotte Law Finally Gets
Around to Telling Students the School Is Closing, ABOVE LAW (Aug. 24, 2017, 2:31 PM), htt
p://abovethelaw.com/2017/08/charlotte-law-finally-gets-around-to-telling-students-the-schoo
l-is-closing/ [https://perma.cc/8NBY-WYJS].
124 See supra note 90 (discussing law schools sanctioned by the ABA).
125 Many law schools that, in better times had contributed surpluses to their universities,
now depend on university subsidies to operate. For example, the University of Minnesota
Law School, a highly ranked and nationally respected institution, has received millions of
dollars in subsidies from the University of Minnesota in recent years as its first-year enrollment has declined. Maura Lerner, University of Minnesota Law School Seeks Subsidies to
Maintain Top Ranking, STARTRIBUNE (May 28, 2018, 10:30 AM), http://www.startribune.co
m/university-of-minnesota-law-school-seeks-subsidies-to-maintain-top-ranking/483829781/
[https://perma.cc/N3S5-VS63]. See generally Paul Campos, 80% to 85% of ABA Law
Schools Are Currently Losing Money, LAWYERS, GUNS, & MONEY (Nov. 12, 2013, 9:42
AM), http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2013/11/80-to-85-of-aba-law-schools-are-cur
rently-losing-money [https://perma.cc/PX6E-E2CM].
126 For a survey of some recent efforts at innovation, see generally Christine Cimini et al.,
Creative Initiatives at U.S. Law Schools: Report of the Working Group on Creative Initiatives, 7 ELON L. REV. 57 (2015).
127 As discussed above, we note the increase in applicants in the 2018–19 admissions cycle,
but view it as unsustainable in light of the unrelenting constraints in the new-graduate job
market. See supra note 50.
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dressing them, and we hope this helps. We have no reason to believe that there
is anything remotely resembling a universal solution. Beyond long-overdue tactical improvements in the efficiency and utility of the education law schools deliver, there are essential strategic inquiries that we believe are being widely ignored or poorly thought through. These inquiries require difficult introspection
toward a meaningful sense of institutional purpose and mission, and a thoughtful and realistic identification of the students and communities that each law
school predominantly serves.128 Given the differing strengths, resources, and
needs each institution brings to the field of play, we suspect that meaningful
adjustment will be piecemeal, incremental, cumulative, and broadly experimental, with unpredictable pressures and incentives from outside the legal
academy itself.
But the one thing we feel sure of is that, for most American law schools,
the only thing worse than changing will be not changing. So let’s get busy.

128

For one thoughtful perspective on the identity and business-model choices available as a
practical matter, see Richard A. Matasar, The Rise and Fall of American Legal Education, 49
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 467, 504 (2004) (suggesting that, other than a handful of law
schools that can depend on either their very high prestige or their very low cost to distinguish
them, the challenge for the great majority is to rethink their models to provide students value
commensurate with their cost); see also Nancy B. Rapoport, Changing the Modal Law
School: Rethinking U.S. Legal Education in (Most) Schools, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1119,
1123–43 (2012) (discussing how law schools’ needs for change often depend on their circumstances).
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APPENDIX I: YEAR-BY-YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGES DURING THE COMPARISON PERIOD OF COMPONENTS OF PERFORMANCE
VARIABLES ACROSS ENTIRE SAMPLE AND IN THIRDS BY REPUTATION (TUITION FIGURES BOTH AS DISCLOSED AND IN
CONSTANT 2018 DOLLARS)
TABLE A.I.1: COMPOSITE (FULL TIME & PART TIME) MATRICULATING CLASS IN EACH YEAR, ACROSS PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS (N = 110)
2010
336,451

2011
299,578
-11%
-11%

2012
263,262
-12%
-22%

2013
218,240
-17%
-35%

2014
204,809
-6%
-39%

2015
199,752
-4%
-42%

2016
199,243
2%
-41%

32,541

29,691
-9%
-9%

26,900
-9%
-17%

24,451
-9%
-25%

23,264
-5%
-29%

22,353
-4%
-31%

22,387
0%
-31%

Weighted average median LSAT
Weighted average median percentile LSAT129
Weighted average median GPA

158
74
3.38

157
70
3.37

157
70
3.36

156
67
3.35

156
67
3.36

156
67
3.36

156
67
3.39

Weighted average 75th centile LSAT
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT (percentiles)
Weighted average 75th centile GPA

160
80
3.59

160
80
3.58

160
80
3.57

159
77
3.56

159
77
3.57

158
74
3.57

159
77
3.59

Weighted average 25th centile LSAT
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT (percentiles)
Weighted average 25th centile GPA

155
63
3.11

154
60
3.10

154
60
3.09

153
56
3.08

153
56
3.09

153
56
3.09

153
56
3.11

Total Applications
Annual % change
Cumulative % change
Total Matriculants
Annual % change
Cumulative % change

 Calculated as follows: each school’s median LSAT is multiplied by its number of matriculating students; the sum of these is then divided by total
number of matriculants from all schools. The same method is used for weighted average scores on 25th and 75th percentiles, as well as for all three
GPA metrics.
129 Scaled LSAT scores were converted to percentile ranks utilizing data from LSAT Percentiles Table, supra note 60. The scale-to-percentile conversion varies very slightly over the 6-year period; in particular, some scaled scores convert to a slightly higher percentile in later years, reflecting an
overall reduction in the average test scores from 2010 to 2016. We adjusted our scaled-to-percentile conversions to reflect these changes.
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TABLE A.I.2: STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR, ACROSS ALL PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS
2010
90,639

2011
92,634
2%
2%

2012
91,323
-1%
1%

2013
86,076
-6%
-5%

2014
72,721
-16%
-20%

2015
68,440
-6%
-24%

2016
66,408
-3%
-27%

Total number of students receiving grants
Annual % change

42,805

45,502
6%

44,322
-3%

45,326
2%

45,762
1%

46,569
2%

47,279
2%

Weighted Average Sticker Price130
Annual % change
Cumulate % change

37,388

39,042
4%
4%

40,440
4%
8%

42,233
4%
13%

43,762
4%
17%

45,041
3%
20%

46,883
4%
25%

Weighted Average “Net Price”131
Annual % change
Cumulative % change

31,060

32,008
3%
3%

33,138
4%
7%

33,960
2%
9%

32,445
-4%
4%

31,625
-3%
2%

31,555
0%
2%

Discount on Tuition (Sticker Price - Net
Price)
Annual % change

6,329

7,034

7,302

8,273

11,318

13,417

15,328

11%

4%

13%

37%

19%

14%

Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions)
Annual % change
Cumulative % change

2,815

2,965
5%
5%

3,026
2%
7%

2,923
-3%
4%

2,359
-19%
-16%

2,164
-8%
-23%

2,096
-3%
-26%

Total number of enrolled students
Annual % change
Cumulative % change

WA Sticker Price = i(Net Pricei, * # enrolledi) / i(# enrolled) for all schools i.
“Net Price” for each school is calculated as Quoted Price less the Median Grant multiplied by percentage of enrolled students receiving grants.
Equivalently: Net Price = Sticker Price - (Median Grant * # getting grants / # enrolled).
Weighted Average Net Price is calculated as follows: each school’s Net Price is multiplied by its # enrolled students; the sum of all of these is then
divided by total # of enrolled students.
Equivalently: WA Net Price = i(Net Pricei, * # enrolledi) / i(# enrolled) for all schools i.
130
131
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TABLE A.I.3: TUITION RELATED STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR, ACROSS ALL PRIVATE LAW
SCHOOLS, REPORTED IN 2018 DOLLARS132
2010
42,434

2011
43,154
2%
2%

2012
43,546
1%
3%

2013
44,817
3%
6%

2014
45,749
2%
8%

2015
47,119
3%
11%

2016
49,007
4%
15%

35,251

35,379
0%
0%

35,683
1%
1%

36,037
1%
2%

33,918
-6%
-4%

33,084
-2%
-6%

32,985
0%
-6%

Discount on Tuition (Sticker Price - Net
Price)
Annual % change

7,183

7,775

7,863

8,779

11,831

14,036

16,022

8%

1%

12%

35%

19%

14%

Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions)
Annual % change
Cumulative % change

3,195

3,277
3%
3%

3,259
-1%
2%

3,102
-5%
-3%

2,467
-20%
-23%

2,264
-8%
-29%

2,190
-3%
-31%

Weighted Average Sticker Price133
Annual % change
Cumulative % change
Weighted Average “Net Price”134
Annual % change
Cumulative % change

132

Adjusted for inflation using CPI data. See Robert Shiller, Online Data, YALE U., http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm [https://perma.cc/5T
FB-NBVA] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
133 See supra note 130.
134 See supra note 131.
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TABLE A.I.4: COMPOSITE MATRICULATING CLASS IN EACH YEAR, ACROSS PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS: TOP 37 SCHOOLS
2010
188,918

2011
165,305
-12%

2012
146,966
-11%

2013
131,488
-11%

2014
130,725
-1%

2015
124,720
-5%
-34%

2016
130,978
5%
-31%

11,101

10,508
-5%

9,915
-6%

9,604
-3%

9,699
1%

9,353
-4%
-16%

9,633
3%
-13%

Weighted average median LSAT
Weighted average median percentile LSAT
Weighted average median GPA

166
93
3.64

166
93
3.64

165
91
3.63

164
90
3.63

164
90
3.62

163
87
3.63

163
87
3.64

Weighted average 75th centile LSAT
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT (percentiles)
Weighted average 75th centile GPA

168
96

167
94

167
94

166
93

166
93

166
93

166
93

3.77

3.77

3.75

3.75

3.75

3.76

3.77

163
87

162
85

162
85

161
83

160
80

160
80

160
80

3.41

3.41

3.39

3.39

3.39

3.39

3.40

Total Applications
Annual % change
5- & 6-year % change from 2010
Total Matriculants
Annual % change
5- & 6-year % change from 2010

Weighted average 25th centile LSAT
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT (percentiles)
Weighted average 25th centile GPA
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TABLE A.I.5: STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR: TOP 37 SCHOOLS
2010
33,513

2011
33,994
1%

2012
33,642
-1%

2013
32,733
-3%

2014
30,392
-7%

2015
29,893
-2%

2016
29,895
0%
-11%

Total number receiving grants
% students receiving grants

17,406
52%

18,111
53%

18,113
54%

18,160
55%

19,498
64%

20,364
68%

21,535
72%

Weighted Average Sticker Price
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

43,372

45,150
4%

46,762
4%

48,833
4%

50,728
4%

52,191
3%

54,143
4%
25%

Weighted Average “Net Price”
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

35,056

35,892
2%

37,167
4%

38,160
3%

36,789
-4%

36,400
-1%

36,135
-1%
3%

Weighted Average Discount on Tuition
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

8,316

9,258
11%

9,595
4%

10,674
11%

13,939
31%

15,791
13%

18,008
14%
117%

Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions)
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

1,175

1,220
4%

1,250
2%

1,249
0%

1,118
-10%

1,088
-3%

1,080
-1%
-8%

Total number of enrolled students
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
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TABLE A.I.6: TUITION RELATED STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR, REPORTED IN 2018 DOLLARS135:
TOP 37 SCHOOLS
2010
49,225

2011
49,905
1%

2012
50,352
1%

2013
51,821
3%

2014
53,032
2%

2015
54,599
3%

2016
56,595
4%
15%

39,787

39,672
0%

40,020
1%

40,495
1%

38,460
-5%

38,079
-1%

37,772
-1%
-5%

Weighted Average Discount on Tuition
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

9,438

10,233
8%

10,332
1%

11,327
10%

14,572
29%

16,520
13%

18,823
14%
99%

Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions)
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

1,333

1,349
1%

1,346
0%

1,326
-2%

1,169
-12%

1,138
-3%

1,129
-1%
-15%

Weighted Average Sticker Price
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
Weighted Average “Net Price”
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

135

Adjusted for inflation using CPI data. See Shiller, supra note 132.
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TABLE A.I.7: COMPOSITE MATRICULATING CLASS IN EACH YEAR, ACROSS PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS: MIDDLE 36 SCHOOLS
2010
85,824

2011
78,307
-9%

2012
67,457
-14%

2013
50,886
-25%

2014
43,026
-15%

2015
42,674
-1%
-50%

2016
41,099
-4%
-52%

9,683

8,756
-10%

7,875
-10%

6,853
-13%

6,488
-5%

6,498
0%
-33%

6,581
1%
-32%

Weighted average median LSAT
Weighted average median percentile LSAT
Weighted average median GPA

157
70
3.37

156
67
3.35

155
63
3.32

154
60
3.30

153
56
3.30

153
56
3.29

153
56
3.31

Weighted average 75th centile LSAT
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT (percentiles)
Weighted average 75th centile GPA

159
77

159
77

158
74

157
70

156
67

156
67

156
67

3.59

3.56

3.56

3.53

3.53

3.52

3.55

154
60

153
56

152
52

151
48

150
44

150
44

150
44

3.09

3.08

3.05

3.02

3.02

3.01

3.02

Total Applications
Annual % change
5- & 6-year % change from 2010
Total Matriculants
Annual % change
5- & 6-year % change from 2010

Weighted average 25th centile LSAT
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT (percentiles)
Weighted average 25th centile GPA
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TABLE A.I.8: STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR: MIDDLE 36 SCHOOLS
2010
28,170

2011
28,335
1%

2012
27,693
-2%

2013
25,575
-8%

2014
20,924
-18%

2015
19,640
-6%

2016
19,158
-2%
-32%

Total number receiving grants
% students receiving grants

12,800
45%

13,966
49%

13,069
47%

13,955
55%

13,318
64%

13,960
71%

14,311
75%

Weighted Average Sticker Price
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

36,477

38,202
5%

39,499
3%

40,589
3%

41,236
2%

42,169
2%

43,520
3%
19%

Weighted Average “Net Price”
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

30,179

30,986
3%

32,216
4%

32,130
0%

29,991
-7%

27,968
-7%

37,661
-1%
-8%

6,298

7,217
15%

7,283
1%

8,459
16%

11,245
33%

14,201
26%

15,859
12%
152%

850

878
3%

892
2%

822
-8%

628
-24%

549
-12%

530
-4%
-38%

Total number of enrolled students
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

Weighted Average Discount on Tuition
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions)
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
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TABLE A.I.9: TUITION RELATED STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR, REPORTED IN 2018 DOLLARS136:
MIDDLE 36 SCHOOLS
Weighted Average Sticker Price
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
Weighted Average “Net Price”
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
Weighted Average Discount on Tuition
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions)
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

136

2010
41,400

2011
42,226
2%

2012
42,532
1%

2013
43,073
1%

2014
43,109
0%

2015
44,115
2%

2016
45,492
3%
10%

34,252

34,249
0%

34,690
1%

34,096
-2%

31,353
-8%

29,258
-7%

28,914
-1%
-16%

7,148

7,977
12%

7,843
-2%

8,977
14%

11,756
31%

14,857
26%

16,577
12%
132%

965

970
1%

961
-1%

872
-9%

656
-25%

575
-12%

554
-4%
-43%

Adjusted for inflation using CPI data. See Shiller, supra note 132.
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TABLE A.I.10: COMPOSITE MATRICULATING CLASS IN EACH YEAR, ACROSS PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS: BOTTOM 37 SCHOOLS
2010
61,709

2011
55,964
-9%

2012
48,839
-13%

2013
35,867
-27%

2014
31,057
-13%

2015
28,358
-9%
-54%

2016
27,166
-4%
-56%

11,757

10,427
-11%

9,110
-13%

7,994
-12%

7,077
-11%

6,502
-8%
-45%

6,173
-5%
-47%

Weighted average median LSAT
Weighted average median percentile LSAT
Weighted average median GPA

151
48
3.13

150
44
3.12

149
40
3.10

148
37
3.07

147
34
3.05

147
34
3.04

147
34
3.07

Weighted average 75th centile LSAT
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT (percentiles)
Weighted average 75th centile GPA

154
60

153
56

153
56

152
52

151
48

151
48

151
48

3.42

3.40

3.39

3.36

3.35

3.35

3.35

148
37

148
37

146
30

145
27

145
27

145
27

145
27

2.84

2.82

2.80

2.77

2.75

2.73

2.76

Total Applications
Annual % change
5- & 6-year % change from 2010
Total Matriculants
Annual % change
5- & 6-year % change from 2010

Weighted average 25th centile LSAT
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT (percentiles)
Weighted average 25th centile GPA
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TABLE A.I.11: STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR: BOTTOM 37 SCHOOLS
2010
28,956

2011
30,305
5%

2012
29,988
-1%

2013
27,768
-7%

2014
21,405
-23%

2015
18,907
-12%

2016
17,355
-8%
-40%

Total number receiving grants
% students receiving grants

12,599
44%

13,425
44%

13,140
44%

13,211
48%

12,946
60%

12,245
65%

11,433
66%

Weighted Average Sticker Price
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

31,350

32,977
5%

34,218
4%

35,966
5%

36,340
1%

36,720
1%

38,091
4%
22%

Weighted Average “Net Price”
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

27,291

28,607
5%

29,471
3%

30,694
4%

28,674
-7%

27,873
-3%

27,964
0%
2%

4,059

4,369
8%

4,747
9%

5,272
11%

7,666
45%

8,847
15%

10,127
14%
150%

790

867
10%

884
2%

852
-4%

614
-28%

527
-14%

485
-8%
-39%

Total number of enrolled students
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

Weighted Average Discount on Tuition
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions)
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
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TABLE A.I.12: TUITION RELATED STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR, REPORTED IN 2018
DOLLARS137: BOTTOM 37 SCHOOLS
Weighted Average Sticker Price
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
Weighted Average “Net Price”
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
Weighted Average Discount on Tuition
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions)
Annual % change
6-year % change, 2010–16

137

2010
35,580

2011
36,450
2%

2012
36,846
1%

2013
38,166
4%

2014
37,990
0%

2015
38,414
1%

2016
39,817
4%
12%

30,974

31,620
2%

31,734
0%

32,572
3%

29,976
-8%

29,159
-3%

29,231
0%
-6%

4,606

4,829
5%

5,112
6%

5,594
9%

8,014
43%

9,256
15%

10,585
14%
130%

897

958
7%

952
-1%

904
-5%

642
-29%

551
-14%

507
8%
-43%

Adjusted for inflation using CPI data. See Shiller, supra note 132.
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APPENDIX II: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE WITH ALL ACCREDITED LAW SCHOOLS
TABLE A.II.1: COMPARISON BETWEEN ALL PUBLIC & PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS (N = 188) AND PRIVATE ONLY LAW SCHOOLS (N = 110)
Total Applications—all schools
Annual % change
Ratio: private schools vs all schools
Total Matriculants—all schools
Annual % change
Ratio: private schools vs all schools
Weighted average median LSAT—all school
Weighted average median percentile LSAT—
all schools
Weighted average median GPA—all schools
Weighted average median LSAT—private
schools
Weighted average median percentile LSAT—
private schools
Weighted average median GPA—private
schools

2010
593,862

2011
524,430
-12%
57%

2012
458,342
-13%
57%

2013
375,485
-18%
58%

2014
344,657
-8%
59%

2015
329,543
-4%
59%

2016
335,485
2%
59%

67%

44,418
-8%
67%

40,479
-9%
66%

37,219
-8%
66%

35,504
-5%
66%

34,621
-2%
65%

34,631
0%
65%

158
74

158
70

157
70

157
67

156
67

156
67

157
67

3.42

3.41

3.40

3.39

3.39

3.39

3.42

158

157

157

156

156

156

156

74

70

70

67

67

67

67

3.38

3.37

3.36

3.35

3.36

3.36

3.39

57%
48,323

TABLE A.II.2: COMPARISON BETWEEN ALL PUBLIC & PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS (N = 188) AND PRIVATE ONLY LAW SCHOOLS (N = 110)
Total number of enrolled students
Annual % change
Ratio of private schools to all schools

2010
137,274
66%

2011
140,282
2%
66%

2012
137,548
-2%
66%

2013
130,400
-5%
66%

2014
119,178
-9%
61%

2015
111,339
-7%
61%

2016
106,170
-5%
63%

